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I. INTRODUCrION
Nursing is maturing into an increasingly advanced, sophisticated,
specialized, and independent profession. Consequently, nurses are confronting
new challenges and undertaking additional responsibilities. The nurse's role
in providing patient care clearly is expanding-especially as a response to the
insistent demand for additional and more cost-effective health care.
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Traditionally, a distinct division existed between a nurse and a physician.
The nurse functioned within a very delimited framework. Rather than
diagnose, treat, or prescribe medication (activities definitely performed by
physicians), it was sufficient for the nurse to wait for and then undiscemingly
obey the physician's order. Indeed, it was unprecedented for a nurse to
question a physician's order. The nurse was expected to assist the physician
and not question the practice or competency of a physician.
The role of the nurse has been recast remarkedly. Conventional notions
concerning the division of responsibility between physicians and nurses are
disappearing. The locus of authority for patient care decision-making is
diffusing. Today, many of a physician's traditional functions are undertaken
by nurses who frequently operate independently of a physician. In many
instances the nurse's responsibilities have been increased to encompass the
actual examination, diagnosis, and treatment of a patient without any direct
supervision by a physician.
The nurse's expanded role in patient care, the higher acuity level of
hospitalized patients, the continual development of highly specialized and
sophisticated medical technology the heightened emphasis on independent
nursing practice, and the evolution and maturation of nursing into a
"profession" will thrust nurses into positions of increased accountability. A
corresponding rise in legal liability will inevitably result.
Nurses currently are more noticeable and will appear in the courtroom as
expert witnesses, defendants, and most commonly, as co-defendants with
hospitals and other health care providers. Nurses naturally are concerned with
their potential legal liability and consequently will procure more and greater
malpractice insurance. As a direct result of increased coverage, however,
patients' attorneys will more frequently name and sue nurses individually as
defendants in a lawsuit.
Since expanded responsibility portends increased liability, a thorough
understanding of the law must be achieved for nurses' rights to be adequately
protected and for nurses to be held properly accountable for their legal
obligations. This work examines the legal rights, responsibilities, and
particularly the potential legal liability of the nurse, in the contexts of modem
nursing practice and current statutes and caselaw. The work focuses on one
major aspect of the nurse's legal liability - the tort, or civil wrong, of negligence.-
The first major part of the work defines key legal concepts and terms,
discusses the elements of the tort lawsuit of negligence, and explains important
tort rules. The standard of care required of the nurse and the sources of that
standard are analyzed. Many nursing functions and responsibilities have been
the subject of court treatment, thereby providing authoritative guidelines as to
the proper standard of care. Examples from the caselaw are provided to
illustrate how nurses can contravene the applicable standard of care. The
standard of care for nurses who practice in specialized roles is examined. A
negligence lawsuit is differentiated from a malpractice action. The necessity,
use, and qualification of expert witnesses are addressed. Technical, complex,
yet crucial, legal doctrines regarding proof of the violation of the standard of
care and the required causation between such a violation and the ultimate harm
to the patient are explained.
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The work demonstrates that certain standards of care, and thus types of
negligence, are specific to nurses. Accordingly, the second major part of the
work examines the rights, responsibilities, and potential tort liability of nurses
with respect to frequently encountered categories of nursing negligence, such
as the failure to observe, to assess, to communicate, to follow orders, and to
intervene.3
II. THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE
A. Introduction
Negligence is defined as a duty or obligation to conform to a certain standard
of conduct; a breach of that duty; a causal connection between the breach and
an injury; and the presence of actual injury.4 In order for a patient-plaintiff to
prevail, he or she must prove that the defendant-nurse5 was negligent-i.e., he
must prove all of the elements of negligence. Until the plaintiff can do so, the
nurse is presumed to be free from negligence and therefore free from any tort
liability.6 The negligence plaintiff must prove his case by a "preponderance of
the evidence," that is, sufficient, credible, probative evidence to convince a jury
that the essential allegations in the lawsuit are more probably true than not.7
3For the purposes of this work, the term "nurse" refers to a registered professional
nurse, licensed to practice nursing under applicable state law, as well as nurses
practicing in expanded roles such as nurse practitioners and nurse anesthetists.
4 For a general discussion of tort law see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
5 See, e.g., White v. Touro Infirmary, 633 So.2d at 755; Simmons v. United States, 841
F. Supp. 748,750 (W.D. La. 1993); Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014,1020 (Ohio 1993);
Miles v. Box Butte County, 489 N.W.2d 829, 838 (Neb. 1992); Anderson v. St. Francis -
St. George Hospital, 614 N.E.2d 841, 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); NuRSE'S HANDBOOK OF
LAW & ETHIcs 202 (Stanley Loeb & Matthew Cahill eds., 1992); Elizabeth J. Armstrong,
Note, Nursing Malpractice in North Carolina: The Standard of Care, 65 N.C.L. REV. 579, 580
(1987).
6 Gibson v. Bossier City Gen. Hosp., 594 So.2d 1332,1342 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (parents
of deceased baby failed to sustain burden thatneonatal nurserynurses failed to properly
monitorand observebabyand failed to timely diagnoseand treatbaby's hypoglycemia);
Cohen v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 720, 723 (Pa. Ct. Super. 1991) ('In order
to establish liability... , the plaintiff was required to establish by competent evidence
that the alleged injection was given in a manner which was negligent and that the
injection was a legal cause of the injury.").
7 See Dixon v. Taylor, 431 S.E.2d 778, 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); White, 633 So.2d at
759 (acknowledging that plaintiff's burden in a medical malpractice case is to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the treatment fell below the ordinary standard of
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B. Duty
1. Introduction
The existence of a legally recognized duty is essential in any negligence
claim. Some relationship must exist between the defendant and the aggrieved
plaintiff for a court to find that the defendantwas under a legal duty to conform
to a certain standard of conduct and to exercise reasonable care to safeguard
the plaintiff's person and property.8 Accordingly, before a nurse can be deemed
negligent for his or her action or inaction, there must be a determination that
the nurse owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.
9
8 See, e.g., Poluski v. Richardson Transp., 877 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
("In order to prove actionable negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a
duty on the part of a defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury."); Porter v. Lima
Memorial Hospital, 995 F.2d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding no liability where nurses
had no independent duty after the accident); Simmons, 841 F. Supp. at 750 ("Medical
professionals owe a duty to avoid acts or omissions which they reasonably foresee could
result in injury."); Downey v. Mitchell, 835 S.W.2d 554, 555-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
Koeniger v. Eckrich, 422 N.W.2d 600, 602 (S.D. 1988); Vassey v. Burch, 262 S.E.2d 865,
867 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 53, at 356-59.
91n Poluski, 877 S.W.2d at 713, an argument against liability was made based upon
the absence of a duty by and between plaintiff and defendants. In particular, defendant
nurses argued that the plaintiff had been discharged and, as such, the patient was no
longer under the nurse's care. The court found that even though the patient was leaving
the premises, the nurses still had a duty to intervene when they saw the patient being
improperly transported by the ambulance service. Id. In Downey, 835 S.W.2d at 555-56,
the plaintiff alleged that three registered nurses failed to review a patient's medical
records which indicated that the patient did not consent to the performance of a tubal
ligation. When the tubal ligation began, the nurses did not intervene. Id. at 556. The court
found that .... Nothing in [precedent] imposes a duty upon the nurses to review the
records of a patient's consent to surgery and to intervene during the course of the
surgery if the surgeon begins to exceed the bounds of such consent." Id. Because the
plaintiff's... petition failed to allege facts showing a duty on the part of the nurses, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint.".
In Walling v. Allstate Ins. Company, 455 N.W. 2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990),
the decedent, a minor, was taken to the hospital after consuming liquor, becoming ill,
and vomiting several times. Id. An emergency room nurse noted that, although decedent
appeared to be in pain, she had no trouble speaking and her speech was clear. Id. The
nurse subsequently informed the decedent that the hospital would need permission
from her parents before she would be treated. Id. The decedent, however, refused to
disclose her parents' telephone number, and the nurse, hoping the girl would change
her mind, left her alone. Id. Once the nurse left the room, the decedent left hospital and
subsequently died in a house fire that night. Id. The court held that the trial court did
not err in finding that defendant hospital had no common law duty to treat plaintiff's
decedent, holding: 'The question whether a duty exists is one of law to be decided by
thecourt. The record clearly establishes that, although decedent walked intodefendant's
emergency room with some difficulty, she did not require medical assistance while
there. Decedent was conscious and coherent. The evidence before the trial court was
insufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether decedent's condition constituted an
unmistakable emergency." Id. See also Kimball v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 421 So.2d 309,310 (La.
Ct. App. 1982) (holding that no duty for nurse to assist plaintiff in either walking or sit-
1995]
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A duty of care is based on the existence of the nurse-patient relationship,
which is a legal status created when the nurse is legally obligated to provide,
or actually does provide, nursing care to a patient or other person.10 A typical
example occurs when an emergency room nurse does not respond carefully
when confronted with an emergency situation.11 Another common example
occurs when a unit nurse fails to execute a direct, explicit, and proper order
from a physician. 12 Although a nurse's status as an employee is an important
source for the nurse-patient relationship, the relationship is not dependent
upon the nurse's employment status. The providing of nursing care is itself
legally sufficient to create the relationship to which the legal duties are
attached. 13 The existence and extent of one's legal duty is a question of law for
a judge to decide and not an issue for the jury.14
2. Nonfeasance
As a general rule, there is no duty to aid another in peril.15 A nurse, for
example, who by chance comes upon the scene of an accident is not under any
legal duty to render emergency medical care because there is no established
ting because, despite being 79 years old, plaintiff had no prior history of health problems,
did not ask for assistance, and did not appear visually incapacitated).
10Clough v. Lively, 387 S.E.2d 573, 574-75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (No nurse-patient
relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, an emergency room nurse,
when an arresting officer brought plaintiff to the emergency room and told the nurse
that the plaintiff was there to have a blood sample taken for alcohol and drug content
because, after the officer submitted the proper written request and the plaintiff
consented to giving the blood sample, the defendant nurse asked plaintiff if he needed
or desired medical treatment and the plaintiff stated that he did not).
11 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Hall, 620 So.2d 533, 534 (Miss. 1993) (alleging that nurses failed
to perform emergency room duties by failing to obtain a pertinent history, failing to
note, record, and document patient's status in emergency room admission sheet, failing
to perform a neurological exam, and failing to inform the emergency room physician of
the patient's status); Feeney v. New England Medical Ctr., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 585, 587(Mass. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing nurse's failure to observe and monitor the patient,
particularly the patient's respiratory rate and breathing patterns). Donna Lee Guarriello,
Nursing Malpractice Litigation: Toward Better Patient Care, 18 TRIAL 78, 81 (1982).
12 See infra notes 291-96.
13 Vassey, 262 S.E.2d at 867 ("A nurse who undertakes to render professional services
[regardless of employment status] is under a duty to exercise reasonable care and
diligence in the application of her knowledge and skill to the patient's case and to use
her best judgment in the treatment and care of patients."); ELI BERNZWEIG, THE NURSE'S
LIABILITY FOR MALPRACTICE 32,33 (5th ed. 1990).
14 See, e.g., Mercil v. Mathers, 517 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1994) (court declined to identify
or impose a legal duty on nurses "to insist or even order the doctors to conduct an 'on
hands' examination of the patient").
15 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 56.
[Vol. 43:557
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nurse-patient relationship.16 However, once a nurse provides nursing services
at the emergency scene, regardless of whether said services are requested, the
nurse-patient relationship is established. 17
3. The Duty of Care: To Whom Owed
Although there is no general requirement that a person act to assist another,
when action is taken, the law will demand that the actor perform as would a
reasonably prudent person. If a reasonably prudent person would not have
foreseen harm to anyone from his or her action, there is no legal duty owed to
anyone who is unexpectedly injured by the conduct.18 A defendant nurse's
duty, therefore, extends only to foreseeable plaintiffs: that is, those victims
located in a predictable scope of danger caused by the nurse's careless conduct;
and if a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of harm to a patient,
then the nurse owes a duty of care to that patient.19
C. The Reasonable Person
1. Introduction
The doctrine of negligence is founded upon the existence of a uniform,
external, and objective standard of conduct.20 The legal system supplies this
standard by creating a fictitious person-the reasonably prudent person.
21 This
fictitious person is a composite of the community's judgment as to how the
typical community member should behave. Accordingly, each person in the
community owes a legal duty to behave as the reasonably prudent person
would have behaved in the same or similar circumstances. Negligence is a
failure to do what the reasonably prudent person would have done.22
16 BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 32-33, 38.
171d.
18KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 43.
19See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1015 (finding liability for injuries resulting from
risks and dangers if the injuries were reasonably foreseeable"); Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1003
(holding that duty owed by nurse to patient encompassed risk of harm encountered by
patient); Belmon v. St. Francis Cebrini Hosp., 427 So.2d 544, 545 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(finding that risk of bleeding, and the nurse's failure to closely monitor the patient was
within the scope of protection or the duty of care imposed); Daniel v. St. Francis Cabrini
Hosp., 415 So.2d 586, 590 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the scope of protection
afforded by the nurse-patient relationship encompasses a duty to assist a patient when
sitting or standing, where physical and mental incapacities require such assistance;
Kimball, 421 So.2d at 310 (finding no duty for nurse to assist plaintiff in either walking
or sitting because, despite being 79 years of age, plaintiff had no prior history of health
problems, did not ask for assistance, and did not appear visually incapacitated).
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The reasonably prudent person standard is not an internal, subjective, or
personal one.23 The defendant's beliefs and particular limitations are
irrelevant. Instead, the issue is whether the defendant acted as the reasonably
prudent person would have acted in the same or similar circumstances; a
conclusion reached by comparing the defendant's conduct with the
hypothetical conduct of a hypothetical person. All people are held to this level
of care, regardless of whether they are capable of meeting it.24
While the "reasonable person" standard of care remains appliable under all
circumstances, the specific required conduct of the reasonable person,
however, may vary with the situation with which he or she is confronted and
the positions which he or she holds. 25
2. The Nursing Standard of Care
A nurse is expected to possess and use the knowledge, skill, care, and
diligence ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the nursing
profession. A nurse will be liable in tort if harm ensues because he or she does
not have or use such knowledge, skill, care, or diligence.26
When a nurse acts and harm results from his or her action, his or her actions
are evaluated not based upon what a reasonably prudent person would have
done in the situation, but upon what a reasonably prudent nurse would have
done. This special standard affords the nursing profession, as well as other
professions, the opportunity to set their own legal standards of conduct by
employing their own customary practices. 27
231d.
2 41d. at 173-74.
2 5Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hosp. Medical Ctr., 884 P.2d 142,144-45 (Cal. 1994);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 32, at 173-75.
26 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1017, 1023 (arguing that "Because nurses are
persons of superior knowledge and skill, nurses must employ that degree of care and
skill that a nurse . . . of ordinary care, skill, and diligence should employ in like
circumstances."); Feeney v. New England Med. Ctr., 615 N.E.2d 585,587 (Mass. Ct. App.
1993) (Emergency Room nurse committed malpractice by failing to observe and monitor
the patient, particularly patient's respiratory rate and breathing patterns); Wheeler v.
Yettie Kersting Mem. Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32,46-47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (nurses committed
malpractice by failing to assess correctly the condition and well-being of a pregnant
patient, failing to use equipment to ascertain fetal heart tones, and failing to inform
physician of the reasons for the lack of information, including failure to obtain patient's
obstetrical history); Harrington v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Hosp., 569 N.E.2d 15,18
(Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (nurses committed malpractice by failing to monitor and observe
patient, chart and record information, advise physician of significant changes in
patient's condition, and by failing to administer medication); KEETON ET AL., supra note
4,§ 32.
27 See Gill v. Foster, 597 N.E.2d 776, 782 (11. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 626 N.E.2d 190 (111.
1993) (examining the nursing standard of care and requiring expert testimony to
establish that standard); Hurlock v. Park Lane Med. Ctr., 709 S.W.2d 872, 881 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985) ("[Mlembers of ... hospital's nursing staff were required, by accepted
nursing practice, to 'document' in [patient's] medical records compliance with the
[Vol. 43:557
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Accordingly, the nurse owes to the patient a duty to conduct himself or
herself in the manner that a nurse of ordinary and reasonable prudence would
conduct himself or herself in the same or similar circumstances28 -the
"reasonably prudent nurse."29
Of note, a nurse is neither a guarantor nor an insurer against harm to the
patient.30 The nurse is not liable for an honest mistake in judgment or an
incorrect exercise of professional knowledge where the proper conclusion or
course of action is open to reasonable interpretation. Not every unsuccessful
course of treatment or detrimental medical consequence is preventable, and
every such incidence does not automatically result in the nurse's liability.31 Yet,
admitting physician's order to turn the patient every two hours."); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 4, § 32, at 189; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 587-88.
28See, e.g., McClain v. Glenwood Regional Medical Ctr., 602 So.2d at 240,243 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (nurse met standard of care for observing patient's condition, charting
patient's condition and complaints of pain, and informing physician thereof); Deese v.
Carol City County Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 127,128 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (nurse complied with
applicable standard of care for giving intravenous injections); Parker v. Southwest
Louisiana Hospital Ass'n, 540 So.2d 1240, 1274 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (nurses complied
with standard of care for observing new-borns); Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical
Ctr., 768 P.2d 768, 772-73 (Idaho 1989) (nurse not only met but "exceeded" standard of
care regarding the monitoring of urinary output in cardiovascular surgery); LOEB &
CAHILL, supra note 5, at 21; Paula Sweeney, Proving Nursing Negligence, 27 TRIAL 34 (May
1991); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 50, 54,324; Erline Reilly, Nurses and the Law, 26 NEW
HAMPSHIRE BJ. 7, 17-18 (Fall 1984); William Morris, The Negligent Nurse - The Physician
and the Hospital, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 109, 111 (1981) and cases cited therein.
29 Armstrong, supra note 5, at 587 and cases cited therein; Guarriello, supra note 11,
at 78.
30See, e.g., Deese, 416 S.E.2d at 128; Kimball, 421 So.2d at 310 (because a health care
provider not an "insurer" of a patient's safety, there is no liability when an elderly
patient, who was healthy, not incapacitated, and who did not request any assistance,
fell).
3 1See, e.g., Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1337, 1342 ("An unsuccessful course of treatment is
not per se an indication of malpractice."). The Gibson court noted that "Although the
infant had risk factors associated with the development of neonatal hypoglycemia, the
evidence did not establish that nurse... was negligent in failing to make this diagnosis.
The infant did not display the classic presenting signs of hypoglycemia and responded
well to oxygen, indicating the problem was due to mucus, a common complication." Id.
See also Eversole v. Oklahoma Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 818 P.2d 456, 461 (Okla. 1991)
(holding that, although heavily medicated patient fell while nurse was assisting him to
the bathroom, a jury verdict exonerating the nurse was permissible because "[tihe jury
could have concluded from the evidence, including testimony of [the] nurse ... that she
had acted according to the training given to her, according to her best judgment.");
Parker, 540 So.2d at 1274 (nurses not liable because complied with hospital's circulation
and observation policies and acted "within any known and accepted standard of care");
Northern Trust Company v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6, 10 (111. Ct.
App. 1986) (nurse met standard of care in observing new-born, "conscientiously"
charting baby's progress, and communicating baby's deteriorating condition to
physician); Battles v. Aderhold, 430 So.2d 307,313-14 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (nurses met
standard of care in observing patient who had undergone a thyroidectomy,
communicating patient's breathing problems to physician, and by complying with
1995]
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by undertaking to provide nursing services, a nurse is viewed as holding
himself or herself out as having the standard skills and knowledge of the
profession.32
3. Role of Judge and Jury
The existence, definition, and pronouncement of the standard of care are
regarded as questions of law and thus within the province of the judge.
Whether particular behavior contravened this standard is regarded as a
question of fact, usually left to the jury to resolve.33
4. Sources of the Standard
Determining and defining the relevant standard of care is of primary
importance in a negligence case. Ajury acts independently and renders its own
decision as to what the reasonably prudent nurse would have done in any
particular situation. Over time these jury determinations have had the effect of
establishing the nursing standard of care for a particular activity.
When trial court decisions are appealed, moreover, appellate courts are
permitted to state, as a matter of law, whether certain nursing conduct was or
was not negligent. These pronouncements serve as legal precedents to be
referred to in future cases involving the same or similar facts,34 thereby
functioning as authoritative precedents and establishing legal criteria for the
future conduct of nurses in performing specific nursing activities.35
Federal and state statutes and administrative regulations also prescribe
standards of care for the protection of others. The statute or regulation can be
introduced into evidence to establish the standard of careful behavior.36 For
example, every jurisdiction that licenses nurses has a Nurse Practice Act which
is designed to protect the public by defining the scope of nursing. These statutes
typically state nursing responsibilities, functions, and procedures; they define
important terms such as the "practice" of nursing and set forth specific legal
hospital's "Quickstep" emergency procedure when patient went into respiratory
distress; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 32.
32See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1020-21; Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18; KEETON Er
AL., supra note 4, § 32, at 185-87.
33 See George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1121,1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("The jury must
be allowed to decide whether the [hospital's] failure to notify the doctors of [patient's]
change in medical status, which may have indicated either hypoxia or sepsis, was a
breach of duty owed to [patient]."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 37, at 235-38.
34 See, e.g., Feeney, 615 N.E.2d at 587 (court enunciated "minimum standard of care"
for ER nurses monitoring and observing patients).
35 See, e.g., White, 866 S.W.2d at 47 (court ennunciated standard of care for
transferring pregnant patient); Simmons, 841 F. Supp. at 750 (court enunciated precise
standards of "proper prophylactic care" to prevent risk of infection from intravenous
needle use).
3 6KEETON ETAL, supra note 4, § 36, at 220-21.
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standards for nursing practice.37 Such legislative pronouncements can be used,
therefore, to define the nursing standard of care.
38
In addition to the Nurse Practice Act, state legislatures regulate the nursing
profession by creating state boards of nursing with broad regulating power.39
These administrative agencies promulgate and enforce regulations which have
the force of law and which more precisely define the content and practice of
nursing.40 Charged with broad power, nursing boards often enact rules
regarding educational requirements and admission criteria for licensure,
specify the activities that nurses and nurse practitioners are permitted to
engage in, and establish procedures for administering the rules and
disciplining nurses who violate the rules.41
Private entities can also establish and define the nursing standards of care.
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO),
a private nongovernmental agency that establishes standards for the operation
of hospitals, has promulgated A Guide to JCAHO Nursing Seruices Standards42
to govern nurses at JCAHO hospitals or facilities. These guidelines provide
evidence of the appropriate standard of care43 even at facilities which are not
accredited by JCAHO.44
3 7 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.001 et. seq. (West 1994 and Supp. 1995); Berdyck, 613
N.E.2d at 1021 n.1 (definition of practice of professional nursing pursuant to Ohio
statute).
38 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.003 (West 1994 and Supp. 1995); Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d
at 1017 ("[S]tatutory standards for licensure are relevant to the standard of conduct
required of licensed nurses in Ohio and may be used to prove that standard."); LOEB &
CAHILL, supra note 5, at 4; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34; GEORGE POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS
OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 225 (5th ed. 1990); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 269;
Gail Vallot, Nurse Liability, 24 TRIAL 99 (Jan. 1988); Armstrongsupra note 5, at 580,590-91;
Carole Kehoe, Contemporary Nursing Roles and Legal Accountability: The Challenge of
Nursing Malpractice for the Law Librarian, 79 LAW LIB. J. 419,426 (1987); Reilly, supra note
28, at 17; Mary E. Kelly & Thomas R. Garrick, Nursing Negligence in Collaborative Practice:
Legal Liability in California, 12 LAW, MEDICINE, AND HEALTH CARE 260,263 (1984); Scanlan,
The Nurse and Malpractice: Legal Problems in the Nursing Profession, 9 W. ST. U.L. REV. 227,
(1982).
39 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.004 (West 1994 and Supp. 1995); LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 9; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 228.
40 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.006 (West 1994 and Supp. 1995); 16 FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. Chapters 595-1 et. seq. (1995); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 9; POZGAR,
supra note 38, at 228; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 78; Reilly, supra note 28, at 11.
41 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. Chapters 595-1 et. seq. (1995); LOEB & CAHILL, supra
note 5, at 9; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 228.
42 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 17,22-28; Sweeney, supra note 26, at 34; Armstrong,
supra note 5, at 590-91; Reilly, supra note 28, at 17; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 78.
43 Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 590-91; Reilly, supra note
28, at 17; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 78.
44 Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34.
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Nursing organizations such as the American Nurses Association (hereinafter
ANA), and various specialty organizations such as the Emergency Nurses
Association (hereinafter ENA), promulgate their own rules of conduct which
serve as guidelines for acceptable nursing practice.45 The ANA's standards are
generally applicable to nurses in all settings, whereas each of the ANA's
divisions, such as medical-surgical, maternal-child, geriatrics, and mental
health, have established their own distinct specialty standards.46 Nursing
Codes of Ethics, such as those produced by the ANA, ENA, and individual
hospitals, also contain standards of care which are applicable to nurses
practicing in the profession. 47
Lastly, procedures, rules, regulations, and by-laws of various health care
institutions can be used to define the nursing standard of care.48 For example,
a hospital's procedure manual for nurses or a nurse's job description may set
forth in detail specific rules of conduct for nurses.4 9 A nurse that works for a
hospital is legally obligated to be aware of these policies and procedures and
to comply with the institution's rules and regulations.50 Other practitioners in
4SKoeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602 ("standards published by American Nurses Ass'n
and various general practice treatises" can be utilized to resolve nursing malpractice
case); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 16-17,18-21; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34; POZGAR,
supra note 38, at 230-31; Kehoe, supra note 38, at 425-26; Armstrong, supra note 3, at
590-91; Dolores Garlo, Recognition of the Growing Responsibilities and Accountability in the
Nursing Profession, 11 J. OF CONTEMP. L. 239, 257 (1984); Reilly, supra note 28, at 11;
Guarriello, supra note 11, at 78.
46LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 16-17.
47LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 17; Reilly, supra note 28, at 11.
481n Taylor v. City of Beardstown, 491 N.E.2d 803, 811 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986), the court
stated "not only may expert medical testimony establish the applicable standard of care,
but regulations, standards, and hospital bylaws are also admissible on the issue."
In Alvis v. Henderson Obstetrics, 592 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992), nurses
failed to detect a baby's breech position in time for a doctor to perform a cesarean
delivery, resulting in severe injuries to the baby's kidneys. At the time of occurrence the
hospital had a written policy requiring that its labor and delivery nurses be able to
determine the presenting part of the baby by doing a vaginal exam.
Battles, 430 So.2d at 314 (nurses not negligent in instituting and complying with
hospital's "Quickstep" procedure, designed to notify certain personnel that an
emergency has occurred and to secure the presence of these personnel, together with
certain emergency equipment, at the scene of the emergency); JANINE FIESTA, 20 LEGAL
PITFALLS FOR NURSESTO AVOID 24-25 (1994) and cases cited therein; LOEB & CAHILL, supra
note 5, at 102; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 269; Vallot, supra note 38, at 99; Armstrong,
supra note 5, at 590-91; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 78; Morris, supra note 28, at 113.
49 FIESTA, supra note 48, at 24-25; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 590-91; Reilly, supra note
28, at 17; Morris, supra note 28, at 113.
50 See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Graham, 883 S.W.2d 433,437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(nurses failed to comply with hospital's policies and rules in failure to restrain case);
Tobia v. CooperHospital Univ. Medical Ctr., 643 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1994) (nurses committed
malpractice by not complying with hospital policy of not leaving patients unattended
on emergency room stretchers with side rails down); Scribner v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 866
P.2d 437, 441 (Okla. App. 1992) (evidence clearly demonstrated that nurses were either
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the same or related professions can provide evidence of customary and current
nursing practice by means of their testimony as expert witnesses.51
Although all of the preceding sources provide evidence of the appropriate
standard of care, these standards represent only minimal criteria, and a court
or a jury may impose higher legal standards.52
5. Negligence v. Malpractice
If a person acquires special knowledge, skill, or competence in a particular
area or field, the law requires that person act consistently with his or her
superior knowledge or skills.53 If a nurse performs a service in a recognized
profession, she is held to the special standard of knowledge and ability
customarily exercised by qualified members of her profession, regardless of
whether she actually possesses such knowledge and skills.54
The negligent conduct of a person practicing a profession is usually
designated "malpractice."55 The term does not imply a greater degree of fault;
the reasonable person standard is still utilized to indicate culpability.
56
However, professionals, including nurses, are judged by the standard of
conduct of their profession since the public properly relies on the special
expertise of the profession. Their failure to utilize the degree of care and skill
that a reasonably prudent qualified member of the profession would exercise
subjects them to "malpractice" tort liability.57
ignorant of or failed to adhere to hospital policies concerning patient identification);
LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 102.
51See, e.g., Biddle v. Sartori Memorial Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 799-800 (Iowa 1994)
(supporting use of physician and nurse expert witnesses in failure to document,
communicate, and diagnose case); Feeney, 615 N.E.2d at 587 (discussing nurse expert
witness testimony as to standard of care in observing and monitoring patient's
respiratory rate and breathing patterns); Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1022-23; LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 21; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 269;
Armstrong, supra note 5, at 590-91; Kelly, supra note 38, at 263; Morris, supra note 28, at
113.
52Reilly, supra note 28, at 17.
53KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 32, at 185.
54Id.
55
"A professional malpractice action is merely a professional negligence action and
calls into question the conduct of a professional in his area of expertise." Candler General
Hosp., Inc. v. McNorrill, 354 S.E.2d 872, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). A medical malpractice
case involves three component duties: 1) duty to possess requisite knowledge and skill
possessed by average member of the profession; 2) duty to exercise reasonable and
ordinary care in the application of such professional knowledge and skill; and 3) duty
to use best judgment in the application thereof. Gould v. New York City Health and
Hosp., 490 N.Y.S.2d 87,89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
56See, e.g., Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1337.
57See, e.g., Tobia, 643 A.2d at 4 (patient fall case, nurse violated hospital policy
regarding siderails on stretchers); Feeney, 615 N.E.2d at 587 (failure to observe and
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In the health care field, the term malpractice traditionally encompassed only
the negligent wrongs of a physician. Because nurses were generally not
involved in diagnosis and treatment and were considered physician's servants
with servile tasks understandable by most lay persons, the law imposed
liability against nurses pursuant to the basic theory of negligence, i.e., what
would the reasonable person (as opposed to the reasonable nurse) have done
in the same or similar circumstances? 58
No longer physician's servants, nurses' responsibilities have expanded and
intensified and they now frequently exercise independent professional
judgment. Today, nurses commonly assume functions previously reserved to
the physician practitioner. As they have begun to do so, liability for basic
nursing negligence has shifted to its "professional" counterpart-malpractice
liability.59 The appropriate cause of action against a nurse is a malpractice
action.60
The shift from negligence to malpractice has significant consequences.
Malpractice clearly involves the imposition of a more demanding professional
standard of care by which to measure a nurse's conduct. The courts increasingly
look to the nursing profession to provide the appropriate criteria to formulate
monitor); Wheeler, 866 S.W.2d at 46-47 (failure to take history, use equipment, assess,
and communicate with physician); Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682 (failure to assess); Galloway
v. Baton Rouge General Hosp., 602 So.2d 1003, 1010 (La. 1992) (failure to monitor and
assess); Fairfax Hospital System, Inc. v. McCarty, 419 S.E.2d 621,625 (Va. 1992) (failure
to monitor, assess, and notify physician); Alef v. Alta Bates Hospital, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 900,
904-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (failure to monitor, assess, and properly use equipment);
Brown v. E.A. Conway Memorial Hosp., 588 So.2d 1295,1300 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (failure
to chart); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 17-18 (failure to monitor, chart, advise physician,
and administer medication); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602-05 (failure to question
physician's order and to intervene).
58 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 201, and cases cited therein; Garlo, supra note 45,
at 253.
59 1n Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, 592 N.E.2d 828,833 (Ohio 1992),
Emergency Room nurses failed to observe a child and report his symptoms to physician.
The court stated the following:
Although this court has previously held that an action filed against a
nurse in his or her professional capacity does not fall within the tradi-
tional definition of 'malpractice,' (Citation omitted.), we conclude that
expert testimony is necessary to establish the prevailing standard of
care where the professional skills and judgment of a nurse are alleged
to be deficient.
Seealso Lamb v. Candler General Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 720,722 (Ga. 1992) ("[Tlhe breach
of a duty requiring ordinary care, albeit in a medical context, is not medical
malpractice").
6ORixey v. West Paces Ferry Hosp., Inc., 916 F.2d 608,615 (11th Cir. 1990) (ICU nurses
failed to properly monitor patient's condition and failed to detect presence of
subcutaneous air); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 17-18 (failure to monitor, chart, advise
physician, and administer medication); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 201; Benninger,
Nursing Malpractice-The Nurse's Duty to Follow Orders, 90 W.VA. L. REV. 1291, 1296-97
(1988) and cases cited therein; Morris, supra note 28, at 110-111 and cases cited therein.
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this standard of care. 61 Consequently, expert testimony, particularly from
expert nurse witnesses, will be required to establish the standard and educate
the lay jury.62
In addition, employment of the malpractice theory involves several issues
including the applicable statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are state
statutes which require a party to commence his or her legal action within a
specified period of time; otherwise, the party's lawsuit will be barred by the
"running" of the statute of limitations.63 Some states have promulgated special
statutes of limitations for medical malpractice actions.64 Of significance, these
statutes generally have time periods shorter than those for ordinary negligence
actions.65 Consequently, it is of critical importance to determine how the tort
lawsuit against the nurse is characterized, since the nurse may be subject to the
shorter statute of limitations as well as any other special legal provisions
contained in the malpractice action.66 Presently, there are cases that classify the
tort action against the nurse as malpractice and that apply the shorter statute.67
61 See, e.g., Feeney, 615 N.E.2d at 587 (using expert nurse witnesses to establish
standard of care for Emergency Room nurse observing and monitoring patient);
Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602 (expert nurse witness used in failure to document, inform
physician, and question physician's order malpractice case); Kehoe, supra note 38, at
419-20.
62See, e.g., Feeney, 615 N.E.2d at 587 (precise standard of care in failure to observe and
monitor case derived from expert nurse witness); Leonard v. Providence Hosp., 590
So.2d 906, 908 (Ala. 1991) (expert witness required to determine whether "proper
nursing practice and care" mandated that siderails be raised); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at
602 (expert nurse witness utilized where plaintiff alleged a failure to document, inform
physician, and question physician's order); Candler, 354 S.E.2d at 876 (holding that
expert testimony is necessary to establish acceptable professional conduct and
deviations therefrom); Gould, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 88-89 ("Simple negligence cases are those
where the alleged negligent act is readily determined by the trier of fact based upon
common knowledge, while malpractice involves the issue of treatment received by the
patient and usually requires a decision to be based upon testimonyof conflicting medical
experts."); Kehoe, supra note 38, at 419-20; Morris, supra note 28, at 111.
63See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West 1995); Morris, supra note 28, at 140.
64See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(4) (West 1995); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at
201, 209-10; BERNZWEIG, supra note 11, at 30; Duffy, Statute of Limitations Controlling
Medical Malpractice Claims Applies to Negligence of Nurses, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 469,
471-72 (1985); Morris, supra note 28, at 140.
65See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(4) (West 1995); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at
201, 209-10; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 231; Morris, supra note 28, at 140-41.
66See, e.g., Flowers, 884 P.2d at 145 ("Any distinction between 'ordinary' and
'professional' negligence has relevance primarily when the Legislature has statutorily
modified, restricted, or otherwise conditioned some aspect of an action for malpractice
not directly related to the elements of negligence itself. For example, the statute of
limitations for professional negligence against a health care provider can extend up to
three years... in contrast to the one year applicable to ordinary negligence (citation
omitted) ... . The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) contains
numerous provisions effecting substantial changes in negligence actions against health
care providers .. "); Putnam County Hosp. v. Sells, 619 N.E.2d 968, 971-72 (Ind. Ct.
1995]
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately, there is an absence of uniformity among the jurisdictions as
to whether the unintentional tort action involving the careless nurse is
"negligence" or "malpractice."68 The courts have not used the terms
consistently. Both terms have been used to classify the tort; the terms have been
App. 1993) (cause of action viewed as medical malpractice action and dismissed because
plaintiff did not comply with Medical Malpractice Act and obtain an opinion by a
medical review panel); DeLeon v. Hosp. of Albert Einstein College, 566 N.Y.S.2d 213,
214-15 (N.Y. 1991) ("[T]he essential question to be answered in determining the
applicable statute of limitations is whether 'the conduct at issue constituted an integral
part of the process of rendering medical treatment to ... the patient.' For a cause of
action to survive the shorter statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice and
continue to be viable under the longer statute of limitations applicable to negligence,
thegravamen of the complaint should not be negligence in furnishing medical treatment
or conduct which bear a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical
treatment.... ); Morris v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 597 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991), (where a patient suffered a laceration to her arm as result of nurse placing
a split plastic cup over an intravenous site as a guard her cause of action was
characterized as negligence and thus the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
did not apply); Gould, N.Y.S.2d at 88-90 (characterizing cause of action as "simple
negligence" where plaintiff alleged failure to secure the plaintiff to hospital bed by use
of siderails); Vigue v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hosp., 481 A.2d 1, 3-4 (R.I. 1984)(discussing issue as to which statute of limitations should apply-the two year period
provided for medical malpractice actions or the three year period specified for
negligence actions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.101 et. seq. (West 1995) (statutory medical
malpractice requirements); Duffy, supra note 68, at 471-72 and cases cited therein;
Scanlan, supra note 38, at 231 and cases cited therein; Morris, supra note 28, at 140.
671n DeLeon, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 214-16, the plaintiff alleged that, in order to prevent a
birth with no doctor present a nurse pushed the baby back into womb, causing the child
severe injuries. Id. Addressing the applicable statute of limitations, the court wrote as
follows:
While a cause of action alleging medical malpractice on the part
of a ... nurse... must ordinarily be brought within the 2-1/2 year
statute of limitation applicable to medical malpractice actions, a
cause of action alleging that the hospital was negligent in its hiring
of such an employee, who subsequently commits malpractice, is
subject to the three year statute of limitations applicable to negli-
gence actions.... [Tihe negligent hiring sounds in negligence and
thus was timely brought. However, we are of the view, and now
hold that the remaining causes of action.. . do sound in medical
malpractice and must therefore be dismissed as time barred by the
shorter statute of limitations applicable to such actions .... [Tihe
nurse's alleged conduct was within the realm of the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment - whether good or bad-allegedly exercised by
the nurse. The nurse's conduct must.., be deemed to have 'consti-
tuted an integral part of the process of rendering medical at treatment.
Id. See also Vigue, 481 A.2d at 3-4 (declaring a test for determining the applicable statute
of limitations: "If the acts complained of constituted a necessary, essential, integral part
in the rendition of professional services to the patient, they are subject to the shorter
statute of limitations provided for actions of professional negligence."); LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 201; Duffy, supra note 68, at 471-72 and cases cited therein; Scanlan, supra
note 38, at 231 and cases cited therein.
68 Morris, supra note 28, at 110-11.
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used interchangeably; or not at all.69 In most recent cases, however, the cause
of action is designated as "malpractice,"70 underscoring the law's willingness
to treat nursing as a profession.
6. The "Locality" Rule
Courts have traditionally held that a person practicing a profession be
measured by the degree of knowledge, skill, and care that ordinarily would be
exercised by members of the profession in the same or similar community or
locality.71 Implicit in this requirement was an allowance for fluctuation in the
69 For cases classifying nursing torts as "negligence," see Morse v. Flint River
Community Hosp., 450 S.E.2d 253, 256-57 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (a failure to treat and to
notify a physician is negligence); Georgetti, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (failure to restrain and
disobeying a physician's order is a "professional-negligence" cause of action); Poluski,
877 S.W.2d at 712-13 (failure to intervene is a negligence claim); St. Elizabeth Hosp., 883
S.W.2d at 437-38 (failure to monitor and restrain is a negligence claim); Berdyck, 613
N.E.2d at 1022-23 (failure to observe, assess, inform physician, and follow physician's
order is negligence cause of action); Hunnicutt v. Wright, 986 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir.
1993) (failure to inspect equipment properly is a negligence claim); Atkins v. Pottstown
Memorial Medical Ctr., 634 A.2d 258, 259 (Pa. Super. 1993) ("patient fall" case is a
negligence cause of action): Gould, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 88-90 (failure to use siderails is
"simple negligence" action); NKC Hosps., Inc. v. Anthony, 849 S.W.2d 564, 567-69 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1993) (failure to observe, assess, and question physician's order is a negligence
cause of action); Vincent v. Fairbanks Memorial Hosp., 862 P.2d 847, 849-51 (Alaska
1993) (failure to assess and treat is negligence cause of action); Wingate v. Lester E. Cox
Medical Ctr., 853 S.W.2d 912,917 (Mo. 1993) (failure to assess claim is a negligence cause
of action); Miles, 489 N.W.2d at 838-41 (failure to observe, assess, and communicate is
to be treated as a negligence cause of action); St. Paul Medical Ctr. v. Cecil, 842 S.W.2d
808, 814 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (failure to monitor and to use equipment was properly
treated as negligence case); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, 614 N.E.2d 841,
843,847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (disobeying a physician's order constitutes a negligence
claim); Lamb, 413 S.E.2d at 722 (improper use of equipment constitutes negligence cause
of action). Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473,480-81 (1st Cir. 1994); Tobia, 643 A.2d at 4; Feeney,
615 N.E.2d at 587; Vogler v. Dominguez, 624 N.E.2d 56, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Baptist
Med. Ctr. v. Wilson, 618 So.2d 1335,1338-39 (Ala. 1993); Porter, 995 F.2d at 632-33; Adams
v. Krueger., 856 P.2d 864, 8965 (Idaho 1993); Wheeler, 866 S.W.2d at 46-47; Alef, 6 Cal.
Rptr.2d at 904-05; Lopez v. Southwest Com. Health Ser., 833 P.2d at 1183,1187-88 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1992); Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625; Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97,104-05 (Utah
1992); Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682; Downey, 835 S.W.2d at 555-56; Galloway, 602 So.2d at 1010;
Cohen, 592 A.2d at 723; Pirkov-Middaugh v. Gillette Child Hosp., 479 N.W.2d 63, 65
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Guilbeaux v. Lafayette General Hosp., 589 So.2d 629, 631 (La. Ct.
App. 1991); Leonard, 590 So.2d at 908; Brown, 588 So.2d at 1300; Suire v. Lake Charles
Memorial Hosp., 590 So.2d 619, 621-22 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Rixey, 916 F.2d at 615;
Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 17-18; Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 459 N.W.2d
178,181,183 (Neb. 1990); Koeniger, 422 N.W.2d at 602-05; Garcia v. United States, 697 F.
Supp. 1570,1572-73 (D. Colo. 1988); Hill, 610 N.E.2d at 637; Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 695 P.2d 665, 674-75 (Cal. 1985).
70 See, e.g., Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 480-81 (1st Cir. 1994) (failure to document
treated as malpractice cause of action); Tobia, 643 A.2d at 4 (patient fall due to failure to
restrain treated as malpractice case).
71See, e.g., Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 904 ("It is also well established that a nurse's conduct
be measured by the standard of care.., of other nurses in the same or similar locality
1995]
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standard of care dependent upon the type of community in which the nurse
practiced his or her profession.72 The courts, however, have failed to provide
a clear definition of "community" as well as precise criteria for qualification as
a "similar" community. Courts are also disinclined to exclude expert testimony
based on dissimilar communities. 73
Today, considering the existence of standardized nursing education,
licensing requirements, standardized medical treatment regimens, enhanced
modem communication and transportation, mandatory continuing education,
the ubiquitousness of information, the sophistication of equipment and
technology, and the widespread dissemination of knowledge, as well as the
desire to protect the health care "consumer," support for the older "locality" rule
has disintegrated. 74 As a result, members of a profession in almost all localities
confront the same problems, and possess access to the same knowledge and
technology to solve problems.75
In modem nursing cases the "locality" rule is disappearing. 76 Some courts
have abandoned the rule in favor of a rule treating the community as merely
one factor to be taken into consideration when applying the general standard
of the nursing profession.77 In most jurisdictions, however, the "locality" rule
and geographic considerations have been discarded altogether in favor of
general, national, professional nursing standards to be applied in all cases.78
and under similar circumstances."); Haney v. Alexander, 323 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1984).
72 Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hosp., 458 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (111. Ct. App. 1983)
(discussing "long and tortured history" of locality rule); KEETON ETAL., supra note 4, § 32,
at 187-89; Vallot, supra note 38, at 99; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 595-96 and cases cited
therein;Jane Greenlaw, Nursing Negligence in the Hospital Emergency Department, 12 LAW,
MEDICINE, AND HEALTH CARE 118, 119 (1984) and cases cited therein.
73 In Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Estrada, 872 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993),
the court held that a non-physician nurse who is familiar with the standard of care at
another similar hospital, may qualify by experience to testify as a medical expert in a
medical malpractice action. Id. The nurse need not be familiar with the standard of care
in a particular locale, as long as the nurse is familiar with the standard of care at another
similar hospital. Armstrong, supra note 5, at 595-96.
74 See Bartimus, 458 N.E.2d at 1077; KEETON ET AL, supra note 2, § 32, at 187-89. LOEB
& CAHILL, supra note 5, at 28; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 595-96 and cases cited therein;
Garlo, supra note 45, at 260-61.
75 Bartimus, 458 N.E.2d at 1077.
76 See, e.g., Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014,1023 (Ohio 1993). ("[Wle have serious
doubts as to whether any 'locality' rule is applicable to registered nurses.").
77KEETON ETAL, supra note 2, § 32, at 187-89; Morris, supra note 26, at 112 (and cases
cited therein); Bartimus, 458 N.E.2d at 1078 ("Illinois courts have not chosen to follow
the strict locality rule or to abandon the locality rule altogether, but have chosen rather
to apply the 'similar locality' rule to determine the standard of care applicable.").
7 8See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1023; KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 32, at 187-89;
Armstrong, supra note 5, at 595-96 and cases cited therein; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5,
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7. The Need for Expert Witnesses
In order to prevail in a nursing malpractice or negligence action, the plaintiff
must establish the particular standard of care required. Since this standard
ordinarily is measured in relation to the care exercised by members of the
nursing profession, the plaintiff generally will need the testimony of expert
witnesses to establish the standard of care.79 With the decline of the locality
rule, experts from other communities now may testify as to the standard of
care.
As a general rule, a witness can only testify as to facts and cannot give his or
her opinion. A jury composed of laypersons, however, normally is not capable
of evaluating issues of scientific knowledge and technique. An expert witness,
therefore, is allowed to assist the jury by offering his or her opinion, even on
the issue as to whether the nurse committed negligence or malpractice. 80
If the issue is regarded as simple, nonmedical, or nonprofessional and thus
within the common knowledge, experience, or comprehension of laypeople,
the jury is permitted to infer negligence without the aid of an expert.81 If the
conduct in question is so obvious or apparent that laypeople could identify the
duty of care and its breach, no expert testimony is required.
82
at 28; Morris, supra note 28, at 112 and cases cited therein.
79 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1017, 1023; Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency
Services, Inc., 592 N.E.2d 828,834 (Ohio 1992); Alef v. Alta Bates Hosp., 6 Cal. Rptr.2d
900, 904 (Cal. App. 1992) ('The standard of care against which the acts of a medical
practitioner are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts
.... "); Lopez v. S.W. Comm. Healt. Serv., 833 P.2d 1183, 1187-88 (N.M. App. 1992)
(holding that expert medical testimony is required in malpractice case); Leonard v.
Providence Hosp., 590 So.2d 900, 908 (Ala. 1991) (regarding patient fall case as a
malpractice action and requiring an expert witness to testify on the issue of precautions
against falls); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 32, at 188-89.
80Ramage, 592 N.E.2d at 833-34; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 32, at 188-89.
81 1n Ramage, 592 N.E.2d at 833, the Plaintiff asserted that the case fell within the
'common knowledge exception and therefore did not require expert testimony.'As basis
for the assertion, plaintiff argued that the "alleged negligence of the nurses ... occurred
merely in their observation and reporting of the decedent's condition to the doctor and
that this involves matters within the common knowledge and experience of the jurors."
Id. The court disagreed, however, holding that the allegations in the case went "to the
professional skill and judgment of the nurses - matters not within the common
knowledge and experience of the jurors." For further authority on the use of expert
witnesses see Lamb v. Chandler General Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ga. 1992);
Polonskyv. UnionHosp., 418 N.E.2d 620,621 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing whether
the decision to raise bed rails involves the expert judgment of the physicians and is
therefore beyond the common knowledge of the jury); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 32,
at 188-89.
82 See, e.g., Gill v. Foster, 597 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Smith v. Louisiana
Health & Human Resources Admin., 637 So.2d 1177,1187 (La. Ct. App. 1994) ("[O]nce
there had been repeated episodes of (patient) leaving his ward and becoming confused,
just the common sense of a reasonable lay person [as opposed to a medical professional]
19951
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In an action against a nurse, expert testimony will generally be required in
order to show the nursing standard of care, how the nurse deviated from and
breached that standard, and how the breach in fact caused the patient's harm.83
Because nursing activities commonly involve the exercise of professional
judgment and the application of advanced knowledge and skills to complex
medical and technical situations, expert witnesses will be required to help the
jury understand and evaluate the legal propriety of the nurse's conduct.84 The
impressions and opinions of these expert witnesses, although not controlling,
can be very convincing. It remains for the jury, as the trier of fact, to assess the
would strongly militate in favor of continuous observation of [patient]"); Leonard, 590
So.2d at 908.
83 See, e.g., Ard v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 636 So.2d 1042,1045 (La. Ct. App. 1994);
Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1022-23 finding that expert testimony is required to determine
whether a nurse has satisfied or breached her standard of care. Ramage, 592 N.E.2d at
833-34; Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 904; Gill, 597 N.E.2d at 780-82 (requiring a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice case to present expert testimony to establish the standard of care,
to show that defendant deviated from that standard, and that the deviation resulted in
plaintiff's injury); Cohen v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 720, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (holding that "In this medical malpractice action where the events and
circumstances were beyond the knowledge of the average lay person, it was necessary
that the plaintiff present expert testimony to establish her cause of action."); Candler, 354
S.E.2d at 876 (expert testimony is necessary to establish acceptable professional conduct
and deviations therefrom); Koeniguer Eckrich, 422 N.W.2d 600, 602 (S.D. 1988) (plaintiff
used expert nurse witness in failure to document, inform physician, and question
physician's order case); Gibson v. Bosser City Central Hosp. 594 So.2d 1132, 1337 (La.
Ct. App. 1991); Vallot, supra note 38, at 99; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 587-88 and cases
cited therein; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 230 and cases cited therein; Morris, supra note
28, at 114.
84 See, e.g., Hulman v. Evanston Hospital Corp., 631 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. Ct. App.
1994) (certified rehabilitation registered nurse testified that nurse leaving patient alone
in toilet was not a deviation from the standard of care because plaintiff had used toilet
several times before and there was a call button which plaintiff knew how to operate);
Vogler & Dominguez, 624 N.E.2d 56,63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (deeming expert necessary
in malpractice case concerning surgical nurses because "[a] question about the standard
of care applicable to a surgical nurse [is] something which is not a matter of common
knowledge and which can only be resolved by resort to expert testimony."); Oxford v.
Upson County Hosp., 438 S.E.2d 171, 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Miles v. Butte County,
489 N.W.2d 829,838 (Neb. 1992); Ramage, 592 N.E.2d at 833-34; Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1334;
Cohen, 592 A.2d at 723 (finding expert testimony necessary in a malpractice case
concerning an allegedly improper injection of medication because "[t]he events and
circumstances were beyond the knowledge of the average person."); Leonard, 590 So.2d
at 908 (requiring an expert in a patient fall case where there was no medical order
requiring precautions); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602 (using expert nurse witness where
a nurse failed to document, inform physician, and question physician's order); Keys v.
Mercy Hosp. of New Orleans, 485 So.2d 514, 517 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (anesthesiologist
defined as an expert witness in a nurse anesthetist negligence case); Hurlock v. Park
Lane Medical Ctr., 709 S.W.2d 872, 881-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); BERNZWEIG, supra note
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expert's opinion and to evaluate conflicting expert views in relation to all the
facts and circumstances of the case.85
Not all nursing cases require expert testimony. If the nurse's negligence does
not involve issues of professional judgment, skill, treatment, or knowledge, the
jury is deemed capable, without expert guidance, of comprehending and
applying the "reasonably prudent person" standard and of ascertaining
negligence based on its own common knowledge, intelligence, and experience.
Once an expert is adjudged necessary, an issue often arises as to who is
qualified to testify about the nursing standard of care. In some jurisdictions,
physicians have been permitted to testify about the nursing standard of care
and any deviations therefrom.86 If the physician does testify, however, she must
restrict her opinion to the nursing standard of care and not the physician's
85Chircosta v. Winthrop-Breon, 635 N.E.2d 1019,1030 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding
jury verdict exonerating the defendant nurse where numerous experts testified that the
defendant met the applicable standard of care and the Plaintiff presented 'conflicting,
unsupported testimony'); Biddle v. Sartori Medical Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 800 (Iowa
1994) ("When evidence is in conflict, such as it was here, we entrust the weighing of
testimony and decisionsabout the credibility of witnesses to thejury."); Gibson, 594 So.2d
at 1337.
86 See, e.g., Biddle, 518 N.W.2d at 800; St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Graham, 883 S.W.2d 433,
438 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Physician "gave his expert opinion that the placing of [patient]
in a recliner chair without restraints was a failure to exercise the degree of care that a
reasonably prudent neuro intensive care nurse or institution would have exercised in
the same or similar circumstances."); Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1019; Baptist Medical Ctr.
v. Montclair, 618 So.2d 1335,1338 (Ala. 1993) (the standard of care for obstetrical nurses
and how a failure to meet that standard caused the patient's injuries was properly
established by testimonyof thechief of obstetrics and directorof matemal-fetal medicine
at a university); Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Memorial Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32,46 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (physician testifying the standard of care in certain situations requires that
the nurse communicate with the physician); St. Paul Medical Ctr. v. Cecil, 842 S.W.2d
808, 814 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing physician testimony regarding nurse's
negligence in failing to monitor and detect a child's hypoxia); Alvis v. Henderson
Obstetrics, 592 N.E.2d 678, 682 (ll. App. Ct. 1992) (Physicians "[bloth testified that a
competent obstetrical and delivery nurse should be able to determine whether the baby
was in breech position prior to delivery and that the doctor would rely on the nurse to
make that determination and to report to him in a timely fashion."); DeLaughter v.
Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So.2d 818, 825 (Miss. 1992) (including physician expert
testifying that once a nurse becomes aware of any neurological symptoms, the nurse
needs to have a physician evaluate the patient); Lucas v. St. Francis Cabrin Hosp., 562
So.2d 999, 1004 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Paris v. Kreitz, 331 S.E.2d 234, 245 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985) (acknowledging that "Physicians are clearly acceptable experts with regard to the
standard of care for nurses."); Haney v. Alexander, 323 S.E.2d 430,433-34 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that "since nurses fall within the [statutory] definition of 'health care
provider... we find that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing plaintiff's
medical witnesses [an internist and a cardiologist] to testify on the nursing standard of
care." Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36; BERNZWEIG, supra note 11, at 269; Vallot, supra note
38, at 99; Kehoe, supra note 38, at 427; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 589-90 and cases cited
therein; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 230-31 and cases cited therein.
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standard.87 In other jurisdictions the physician is no longer permitted to testify
about the nursing standard of care since the physician is not a nurse and does
not possess direct knowledge of nursing standards. 88 Even in those
jurisdictions which allow a physician's testimony to establish the nursing
standard of care, such testimony may not be advisable since the practices of
medicine and nursing are two distinct professions and the physician may not
be aware of the customary nursing practices.8 9
Consequently, when a nursing malpractice or negligence case requires the
use of an expert witness, the expert of preference, if not necessity, will be
another nurse.90 As the nurse's role expands and the nurse's responsibilities
are defined more precisely, the testimony of the expert nurse witness will be
necessary to establish and to apply the nursing standard of care.9 1
8. Specialists
If a profession recognizes specialization, and a member of the profession
holds herself out as a specialist, the applicable standard of care is modified and
the specialist is held to a higher standard of care-that to which the specialized
87See, e.g., Baptist Medical Ctr., 618 So.2d at 1338; Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 904; Suire, 590
So.2d at 622; Haney, 323 S.E.2d at 433-34; Vassey, 262 S.E.2d at 867; Armstrong, supra note
5, at 589-90 and cases cited therein.
88 Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36; Kehoe, supra note 38, at 427.
89 Armstrong, supra note 5, at 589-90 and cases cited therein.
90 See, e.g., Hulman v. Evanston Hosp. Corp., 631 N.E.2d 322,327 (111. App. Ct. 1994)
(certified rehabilitation registered nurse used as expert in patient fall case); Poluski v.
Richardson Transp., 877 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Smith, 637 So.2d at
1181; Minster v. Pohl Candler Gen. Hosp., 426 S.E.2d 204, 207-08 (Ga. App. 1992); Roach
v. Springfield Clinic, 585 N.E.2d 1070, 1980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Morris v. Children's
Hosp. Medical Ctr., 597 N.E.2d 1110, 1115-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Koeniguer, 422
N.W.2d at602; Belmon, 427So.2d at546;Plutshack v. The University of Minnesota Hosp.,
316 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1982); Cynthia Northrop & Elise Alpert, Nursing Malpractice, 19
TRIAL LAw Q. 31, 33 (Winter 1989); Kehoe, supra note 38, at 427; Reilly, supra note 28, at
18; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 230-31 and cases cited therein.
91Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1022-24 (OB RN testified as to standard of care of OB nurse
in observing pregnant patient and in assessing signs and symptoms of preclampsia);
DeLaughter, 601 So.2d at 825 (nurse expert witness testified as to the standard of care in
a case including a nurse's failure to contact physician); Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1342 (where
plaintiffs' alleged that neonatal nursery nurses failed to timely diagnose and treatbaby's
hypoglycemia, resulting in an infants death, defendants' nursing expert "testified that
a number of things could have been wrong with the baby and the option that nurse...
chose, that is, stimulating and suctioning the infant, was appropriate."); Hatley, 859
S.W.2d at 379 (using nurse expert witness who recommended intervention when a
patient threatens suicide and has a plan for carrying out the threat); Cohen, 592 A.2d at
723 (using a registered nurse as an expert witness with respect to the standard of care
for intramuscular injections of Demerol and Vistaril); George, 797 P.2d at 1120 (nurse
testifing as to the duty owed to a patient when he showes discernible signs of respiratory
distress); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602; Northrop & Alpert, supra note 90, at 33; Reilly,
supra note 28, at 18; Carlo, supra note 45, at 255; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 230-31.
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subgroup is held.92 As medical knowledge develops and becomes increasingly
more sophisticated, nursing is becoming a highly specialized profession. 93 For
example, nursing presently encompasses numerous specialty areas such as
emergency, critical care, obstetrics, pediatrics, geriatrics, community health,
operating and recovery room, and anesthesiology.94 These specialists have
acquired the additional necessary education and training and, accordingly,
have their own specialist standard of care in addition to the general standards
of care applicable to the nursing practice in general. 95
Consequently, the nurse specialist, performing services within his or her
speciality, will be held to a higher standard of care-that of the reasonably
prudent nurse specialist under the circumstances.96 In order to explicate the
standard and identify any deviation from it, an expert witness of the
appropriate specialty must be qualified by the courts.97 The "locality" rule is
92 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1017; Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682 (labor and delivery
specialists); Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1342-43 (neonatal specialists); Keys, 485 So.2d at 516-18
(nurse anesthetist); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.102(2) (West Supp. 1995) (establishing
specialty standard); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 32, at 185-87.
93FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.003(c) (West Supp. 1995) (definition of "advanced" or
"specialized" nursing practice); Sweeney, supra, note 28, at 34; Northrop & Alpert, supra
note 90, at 32; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 232.
94 See, e.g., Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 564 So.2d 654, 661
(La. 1989); Ann R. Heitland, et al., The Legal Limits of Advanced Nursing Specialty Practice
in Illinois, 81 ILL. B.J. 22-24 (Jan. 1993) (examination of types, functions, and authority of
nurse specialists pursuant to Illinois law); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 56; Northrop &
Alpert, supra note 90, at 32.
95 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.003(c) (West Supp. 1995) ("advanced" or
"specialized" nurses and nurse practitioners); Keys, 485 So.2d at 516-128 (nurse
anesthetist); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 56.
96 See Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 63; Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1022; Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1341-42
(neonatal nursing standard of care); Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682 (standard of care for labor
and delivery nurses); Ewing v. Albert, 532 So.2d 876, 880 (La. Ct. App. 1988) ("A nurse
who practices her profession in a particular specialty, such as labor and delivery, owes
to her patients the duty of possessing the degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily
possessed by members of her profession actively practicing in such a specialty service
under similar circumstances."); Keys, 485 So.2d at 518; Barbara E. Calfee, Nurses in the
Courtroom (1993), at 98-102 (certified registered nurse anesthetist cases), at 111-21
(emergency department cases), at 125-42 (labor and delivery cases), at 150-75
(medical-surgical cases), and at 197-203 (operating room cases). Sweeney, supra note 28,
at 34; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 234; BERNzWEIG, supra note 13, at 56; Garlo, supra note
45, at 258-59; Reilly, supra note 28, at 18.
97 See Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 63; Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648 (neurologist was qualified to
testify as to standard of care of nurse anesthetist); Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1341-42 (nurse
expert testifying as to neonatal nursing standard of care); Keys, 485 So.2d at 516-18
(anesthesiologist qualified as expert witness in nurse anesthetist negligence case);
Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 592 and cases cited therein.
Reilly, supra note 28, at 18.
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not applied to specialists and geographic conditions do not control; the
standard is a national one.98
9. Nurse Practitioners
Many states have independent licensing procedures for nurse practitioners
and have legalized expanded roles for nurse specialists. 99 Nurse practitioners
frequently diagnose and treat patients and manage patients' medical care
regimens; in many instances, they perform routine examinations, order routine
diagnostic tests, and prescribe medication, generally without the direct
supervision of a physician.100 As the nation's health care delivery system relies
more heavily upon specialized nurses, the nurse practitioner will increasingly
function as a physician substitute101 The nurse practitioner, of course, will be
held to the legal standard of the reasonably prudent nurse practitioner.102 Since
the nurse practitioner performs physician functions, his or her conduct will
sometimes be measured against standards taken from the practice of
medicine. 103 Consequently, current interpretations of nursing practice
standards, as well as exposure to legal liability, will require further expansion
and refinement.104
10. Learners and Students
Courts generally have declined to create a legally distinct standard of care
for novices. The novice, learner, student, beginner, or trainee nurse, therefore,
98 See Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1017; Keys, 485 So.2d at 516 (requiring that the field of
anesthesiology is a specialty not limited by the locality rule); Reilly, supra note 28, at 18.
99 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 464.003 -464.012 (West Supp. 1995); Adams, 856 P.2d at 865(diagnosis by nurse practitioner); HErrLAND, ET. AL., supra note 94, at 23-24 (discussing
functions and authority of nurse practitioner pursuant to Illinois law); LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 41; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 233.
10OSee, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.012 (West Supp. 1995); HErTLAND, ET. AL, supra note
94, at 24-26 (authority of nurse practitioner to diagnose and prescribe pursuant to Illinois
Nursing Act); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 41; Sweeney, supra note 26, at 34; POZGAR,
supra note 38, at 233; Dorothy Walker, Nursing 1980: New Responsibility, New Liability, 16
TRIAL 43, 44 (1980).
101 See Fein, 695 P.2d at 674 ("diagnosis' of a patient cannot in all circumstances be
said - as a matter of law - to be a function reserved to physicians, rather than... nurse
practitioners"); Garlo, supra note 45, at 244; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 81.
102See Adams, 856 P.2d at 865 (holding that nurse practitioner committed malpractice
by misdiagnosing patient as having genital herpes instead of severe yeast infection);
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 42, 56 (and cases cited therein); POZGAR, supra note 38, at
234; Armstrong, supra note 5, at 592 and cases cited therein.
103Adams, 856 P.2d at 865 (misdiagnosis by nurse practitioner); Fein, 695 P.2d at 674
(misdiagnosis by nurse practitioner); see also Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 661 ("Nurses who
perform medical services are subject to the same standards of care and liability as are
physicians.").
104Guarriello, supra note 11, at 81; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 232.
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is held to the same standard of care as are nurses who are knowledgeable,
skilled, and experienced in the nursing activity in question.105 The rationale for
applying the same standard to learners and students is the aversion to
compelling the general public to assume the risk of the novice nurse's lack of
knowledge, competence, or skill.106 A patient clearly possesses the right to
presume that all nursing functions will be performed in accordance with a
national objective standard of nursing care. 107
D. Breach of Duty
1. Introduction
Once the plaintiff demonstrates that a nurse owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff then must show that the nurse violated or breached this
duty by means of a careless act or omission which contravened the required
standard of care.108 To fulfill this requirement, the plaintiff must provide
105 1n Hampton, 576 So.2d at 634, a student nurse anesthetist, unaccompanied by
Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist as required by hospital policy, was twice
unsuccessful in intubating a "code" patient. Id. Two experts in anesthesiology testified
that the student nurse lacked "the degree of knowledge, skill, and experience necessary
to perform adequately in this situation." Id. Likewise, in Central Anesthesia Assoc., P.C.
v. Worthy, 333 S.E.2d 829, 831, 833 (Ga. 1985) a student nurse anesthetist was held to
the anesthetist's standard of care where he improperly administered anesthesia causing
the patient to suffer cardiac arrest and subsequent brain damage.
106 BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 60.
10 71d.
108 See Georgetti, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (finding that "[Tihe plaintiff had failed to sustain
his burden of proving that any alleged deviations from standard nursing practice were
the proximate cause of his injuries."); Smith, 637 So.2d at 1186 (upholding trial court's
finding that the hospital did not take adequate precautions to protect the patient);
Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1023 (where obstetrics nurses failed to observe, assess, and inform
physician of signs and symptoms of preclampsia presented by pregnant patient, the
nurses "failed to perform their duties according to the applicable standard of conduct"
and this failure to conform to that standard of conduct is evidence that the nurses, and
the hospital employing them, breached the duty they owed their patient to exercise that
degree of care and skill that the condition of patient reasonably required."); Harris
County Hosp. Dist. v. Estrada, 872 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (nurses
breached duty of care by failing to properly cross-check the patient's prescription with
known allergies and by failing to instruct the patient on how to proceed in the event of
an allergic reaction; Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 628; Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 905; Anderson, 614
N.E.2d at 843, 847 (finding sufficient evidence for the jury to determine if the nurse
breached a duty by contravening physician's order and engaging in nonconsensual
treatment); Galloway, 602 So.2d at 1010 (nursing staff's conduct in caring for patient fell
below required standard of care when nurses failed to observe and investigate recovery
room patient's "noticeable" symptoms); St. Paul Med. Ctr., 842 S.W.2d at 814 (nurse
deemed to have breached duty by failing to monitor, assess, and properly use electronic
fetal monitor); Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 104 (failure to chart fully and accurately breached
the standard of care for nurses; Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625; Morris, 597 N.E.2d at 1116-17
(plaintiff suffered laceration to her arm, as a result of a nurse carelessly placing a split
plastic cup over an intravenous site); Brown, 588 So.2d at 1300); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d
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evidence of what actually occurred and must prove that the nurse acted
unreasonably under the specific circumstances. 109
In order to prove what occurred factually, as well as proving that the nurse
was negligent or committed malpractice, the plaintiff utilizes direct evidence,
that is, documentary evidence such as medical records and witnesses who can
testify to the facts.110 If a plaintiff is unable to produce an eyewitnesses, she can
prove the malpractice by using circumstantial evidence; evidence of one fact,
or a set of facts, from which the existence of a fact to be ascertained may
reasonably be inferred.111
2. Res Ipsa Loquitur
a. Introduction
Occasionally, however, a plaintiff may not be able to meet his or her burden
of proof because of unusual circumstances concerning the injury or because the
defendant possesses the only knowledge regarding what occurred to cause the
plaintiff's injury.112 The law supplies a doctrine to aid the plaintiff in proving
negligence or malpractice in such a case.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or "the thing speaks for itself," is a rule of
circumstantial evidence. 113 The doctrine does not change the standard of care
or shift the ultimate burden of proof; it is merely a means of indirect proof of
at 18; Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1003-04; George, 797 P.2d at 1121; Rixey, 916 F.2d at 615; Hill,
610 N.E.2d at 637; Haney, 323 S.E.2d at 433; Keys, 485 So.2d at 516-18; Azzolino, 322 S.E.2d
at 575; Daniel, 415 So.2d at 590; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 288; Benninger, supra note
60, at 1294 and cases cited therein; Kehoe, supra note 38, at 426.
109See Biddle, 518 N.W.2d at 800; NKC Hosp., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 567; Dixon, 431 S.E.2d
at 782; DeLaughter, 601 So.2d at 825; Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682; Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 905;
Harley, 859 S.W.2d at 379; Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1342-43; Eyomna, 589 A.2d at 658; Parker,
540 So.2d at 1274; Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602; Hodges, 355 S.E.2d at 106; Keys, 485 So.2d
at 518; Azzolino, 322 S.E.2d at 575; Plutshack, 316 N.W.2d at 8; Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at
1572-73; Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544-45; Vassey, 262 S.E.2d at 868; Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at
622; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 269; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 79.
110See, e.g., Ard, 636 So.2d at 1044-46 (discussing testimony of patient's spouse
regarding patient's deteriorating condition and lack of response by nurses to calls for
assistance, lack of documentation in medical records, and testimony of expert nurse
witness concerning six breaches of standard of care provided "[aimple evidence to
support the trial judge's conclusion the nursing staff breached the standard of care.");
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 269.
111 See Cohen, 592 A.2d at 723; Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1002-03 (where nurse perforated the
patient's rectum while giving the patient a preoperational enema, circumstantial
evidence was permissible so long as the "evidence taken as a whole ... exclude(s) other
reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of certainty"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4,
§ 39, at 242-43.
112LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 207-08 and cases cited therein; BERNZWEIG, supra
note 13, at 306.
113See, e.g., Wick v. Henderson, 485 N.W.2c 645, 648-49 (Iowa 1992); Lucas, 562 So.2d
at 1004-05; Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 665; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 808; KEETON ET AL., supra
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negligence; it sanctions plaintiff's primary reliance on circumstantial or
inferential evidence. 114 Of note, the doctrine does not become operative
automatically-the court must determine its use.115
In certain situations, the very fact that a particular harm resulted may itself
establish both elements of the breach requirement: (1) that the defendant nurse
performed some harmful act (or neglected to perform an act); and (2) under
circumstances where such action (or inaction) may be deemed unreasonable.
The law will then allow a rebuttable inference that the nurse was negligent or
committed malpractice. 116
There are three elements to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: (1) the event must
be of a type that normally does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) the event must be caused by an agency, instrumentality, or
source under the management or within the exclusive control of the defendant;
and (3) the event must not have been due to the voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff or any third person.U17
b. Res Ipsa: The First Requirement
The first element of res ipsa loquitur requires that a harm result from an
occurrence. 118 The inference of negligence may arise either where a definite
note 4, Section 39, at 242-44.
1 14 See, e.g., Maciag v. Strato Med. Corp., 644 A.2d 647, 653-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994);
Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61; Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648-49; Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004-05;
Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 665; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 808-09.
1 15See, e.g., Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61; Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004-05; BERNZWEIG, supra note
13, at 309.
1 16See Maciag, 644 A.2d at 653-54; Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61; Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004-05;
Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 665-66, 668-69; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 808-09; BERNZWEIG, supra
note 13, at 309.
1 17See Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61; Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648-49; Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442;
Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004-05; Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 665-66; Fleming, 742 P.2d at 1092;
Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 808-09; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 39, at 244; LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 207-08 and cases cited therein; Jane Greenlaw, Communication Failure:
Some Case Examples, 10 LAW, MEDICINE, AND HEALTH CARE 77,78 (1982) and cases cited
therein.
118See Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61 (where the plaintiff alleged an injury which occurred
while he was undergoing surgery or in recovery following surgery, the court found "The
evidence supports an inference that the nerve palsy suffered by [plaintiff] was not
simply a bad result which is a calculated risk of the type of treatment given him, but is
more probably due to the negligence of those in control."); Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648-50
(applying res ipsa loquitur where the plaintiff sustained permanent injury to ulnar nerve,
located in upper arm, during gallbladder surgery); Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442 (involving
patient misidentification); Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1005 (nurse perforated patient's rectum or
colon while giving a preoperational enema); Fleming, 742 P.2d at 1092 (patient suffered
severe wound to thigh after receiving an injection for a migraine); Cangelosi, 564 So.2d
at 666; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 809 (including a "confused and elderly" unrestrained patient
19951
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cause is known or where the cause of the event is uncertain.119 The plaintiff is
not required to exclude all other possible causes or inferences to a certainty; he
or she need only demonstrate to reasonable persons that the defendant nurse's
negligence or malpractice most probably was associated with the cause of the
event.12
0
In an ordinary case, the common experience, knowledge, sense, and
understanding of non-medical persons can provide the foundation upon
which an inference of negligence can be built, thus obviating the need for expert
testimony.12 1 In certain health care cases, however, the conduct in question is
so blatantly remiss there is little doubt that a health care provider was negligent
or committed malpractice. Such cases arise, for example, when foreign objects
are left in the patient during surgery, when the patient suffers injuries while
unconscious, or when a patient is infected by unsterile or unsafe instruments
or equipment. 122 If the inference of negligence or malpractice depends,
however, upon facts beyond the common knowledge, experience, and under-
who fell from bed); 564 So.2d at 666; KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 39, at 244, 247;
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 308.
119 See, e.g., Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648-50; Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442 (where two shifts of
nurses failed to note the move of the patient in the adjoining bed in plaintiff's room, the
plaintiff sustained injuries when tests were erroneously performed on the plaintiff due
to thepatient misidentification); Fleming, 742 P.2d at 1092 (severe wound to thigh caused
by injection by ER nurse); KEETON, supra note 4, § 39, at 247-48.
120See Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442 (upholding res ipsa instruction in patient
misidentification case where an "unnecessary trip to ultrasound lab ... would not have
occurred if hospital patient identification procedures had been followed"); Lucas, 562
So.2d at 1005 ("In the case at bar, the body of proof discounts other possible causes, than
that of the negligence of [nurse], and would allow a conclusion by the jury, that the
injury was more likely than not caused by [nurse's] negligence .... [W]e consider it well
within common experience that properly given enemas do not cause perforation of the
colon. In the absence of negligence, the giving of an enema will not commonly cause
such an injury."); Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 666; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 39, at 247-48.
121 See, e.g., Flowers, 884 P.2d at 147 (res ipsa loquitur "common knowledge" exception
occurs when a layperson is able to say as a matter of common knowledge and
observation that the consequences of professional treatment were not such as ordinarily
would have followed if due care had been exercised); Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61; Wick, 485
N.W.2d at 648, 650 ("When the foundation facts of res ipsa loquitr are established -
whether by expert testimony or, in the proper case, by the common experience of
laypersons - then the plaintiff is not required to present expert testimony on the
appropriate standard of care."); Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 666; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 809;
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 39, at 244-47.
122 See, e.g., Maciag, 644 A.2d at 653-55 (res ipsa appropriate when plaintiff's wife
sustained injuries after a subclavian venous access catheter fragmented inside her);
Flowers, 884 P.2d at 147; Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648-50 (plaintiff sustained permanent injury
to ulnar nerve, located in upper arm, during gall bladder surgery); Taylor, 491 N.E.2d
at 809; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80.
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standing of the jury, expert testimony must supply a sufficient foundation (or
can demolish an inference which otherwise might have arisen).123
In medical malpractice cases, expert testimony generally is required to
establish the likelihood that the harm resulted from some health care provider's
negligence or malpractice. 124 Laypeople simply are not capable of inferring
negligence or malpractice merely from the occurrence of harm in the course of
complex medical procedures. 125 In such a case, the expert is allowed to testify
directly to the inference itself; that is, that the plaintiff's injury would not have
occurred unless the health care provider was negligent or committed
malpractice. 126
c. Res Ipsa: The Second Requirement
For the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it is never sufficient for the plaintiff
to prove merely that he or she was harmed by the negligence of some
unidentified person; it is "still necessary to bring (the negligence) home to the
defendant. "127 The inference of negligence from the first requirement must be
focused on a particular health care provider. The plaintiff must show that his
or her injury was caused by a specific instrumentality, condition, or source
which was under the defendant's "exclusive" management or control at the
relevant times.128 "Exclusive control," however, is a very flexible and expansive
concept; it may be sufficient that the defendant nurse had the right, duty, or
power to control.129 If other causes for the event are equally probable, the
plaintiff needs evidence that tends to eliminate them.130
123 Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 666; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 809-10; KEETON ET AL., supra note
4, § 39, at 244-47.
124/d.
12SCangelosi, 564 So.2d at 667 n.11; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 809-10.
126 Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 667 n.11.
1 2 7 KEETON ETAL, supra note 4, § 39, at 248-49; accord, Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1005; Cangelosi,
564 So.2d at 666.
128See, e.g., Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61-62 (plaintiff alleged that brachical plexus stretch
condition suffered by plaintiff resulted from negligent placement or manipulation of
his body while he as undergoing surgery or in recovery following surgery); Wick, 485
N.W.2d at 649 ("It should be enough that the plaintiff can show an injury resulting from
an external force applied while he lay unconscious in the hospital; this is as clear a case
of identification of the instrumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to make.");
Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442; Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1005; Fleming, 742 P.2d at 1092; Cangelosi,
564 So.2d at 666.
129 Prosser & Keeton define the burden of exclusivity as follows:
[1In proving the element of exclusive control, the plaintiff is not
required to eliminate with certainty all other possible causes and
inferences, but must show either that the injury can be traced to
a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was
responsible, or that the defendant was responsible for all reason-
ably probable causes to which the accident could be attributed.
1995]
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The "exclusive control" requirement to res ipsa loquitur presents a serious
obstacle in a case with multiple defendants. Where there are two or more
defendants, a plaintiff cannot sustain her case merely by demonstrating that
she was injured by negligence of one or the other.13 1 Instead, she must identify
one defendant as the cause of her harm. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule. Where injury occurs to an "unconscious patient," courts will typically
apply res ipsa loquitur to all health care providers connected to the operation or
procedure involving the unconscious patient.132 This exception is based on the
group nature of the enterprise, the concurrent or joint control exercised by all
parties, the special relationship between the health care providers and the
patient, the non-delegable responsibility for the plaintiff's health and safety
assumed by everyone concerned, and the fact that at least one defendant is
(Citation omitted.)
IT]he evidence designated by the (plaintiffs) points to at least one
specific instrumentality, in addition to the person of (plaintiff),
over which the hospital's employees or agents shared the right or
ability to control and the opportunity to exercise control. The evi-
dence designated by the (plaintiffs) sufficiently reduces the likeli-
hood that the nerve injury sustained by (plaintiff) had some cause
in fact other than the manner in which he was positioned during
surgery and affords a rational basis for concluding that the cause
of the nerve injury more probably than not involved an instrumen-
tality over which the hospital had a right or ability and opportunity
to exercise control.')
KEETON ET AL., supra, note 4, § 39, at 248-49.
Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61-63 ('The element of 'exclusive control' is an expansive
concept which focuses upon who has the right or power to control and the opportunity
to exercise it (citations omitted). Exclusive control is satisfied if the defendant had control
at time of the alleged negligence (citation omitted).")
1 3 0 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 4, § 39, at 250.
131Maciag, 644 A.2d at 653-55; KEETON ETAL, supra note 4, § 39, at 251-53.
132 See Maciag, 644 A.2d at 653-55 (applying res ipsa loquitur collectively upon a group
of potential defendants, including surgical and oncology nurses); Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at
61-63 (res ipsa loquitur is "appropriate when plaintiff alleged that brachial plexus stretch
condition suffered by plaintiff resulted from negligent placement or manipulation of
his body while he was undergoing surgery or in recovery following surgery"). The court
in Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 649, noted:
We think it is a just and logical conclusion that one who, while under-
going a surgical operation, sustains an unusual injury to a healthy part
of his body not within the area of the operation, be not precluded from
invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an action against the doctors
and nurses participating in the operation. The same thing must be said
of the corporate hospital regarding its preceding or subsequent care of
the patient. This is not altered by the fact that all the parties do not stand
in such relationship to one another that the acts of one may be regarded
as the acts of the other ....
See also Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442 (res ipsa instruction proper in patient misidentification
case); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 39, at 251-53.
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liable for the plaintiff's injuries.133 Although not all of the health care providers
could have been responsible for the patient's injury, each provider did have
some contact with the patient, and the patient suffered harm of a kind that
ordinarily is imputed to someone's negligence or malpractice. 134
d. Res Ipsa: The Third Requirement
Res ipsa loquitur demands the absence of any conduct or responsibility on the
part of the plaintiff which contributed to his or her injury.135 Some jurisdictions
have eliminated this requirement because it is inconsistent with the modem
doctrine of comparative negligence, whereby a plaintiff's contributing fault is
not a complete bar to recovery but rather a damage-reducing factor (unless the
plaintiff's negligence is the sole cause of his or her injury).136
e. Procedural Issues
An important procedural issue is the legal effect of establishing res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence to raise the res ipsa
loquitur inference, the court can instruct the jury on the doctrine and the plaintiff
will escape dismissal of his or her case.137
According to the majority of courts, res ipsa loquitur only creates an inference
of negligence; the weight and credibility of the inference are left to the jury and
the jury is permitted, butnot compelled, to find negligence.138 The jury remains
free to find for the defendant nurse, even in the absence of an explanation by
the nurse, unless the inference of negligence is so strong that reasonable jurors
could reach no other conclusion.139 The ultimate burden of proof, however, is
neither shifted to the defendant nurse, nor is there any burden on the nurse to
133See, e.g., Maciag, 644 A.2d at 655; Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 62 ("Exclusive control may
be shared control if multiple defendants each have a nondelegable duty to use due
care."); Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 650; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 39, at 251-53.
13 4See Maciag, 644 A.2d at 653-55 (principal defendants included manufacturer of
broken tube, the manufacturer of the completed product, the hospital, the surgeons, the
oncologists, the surgical nurses, and the oncology nurses); Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 61-63;
Wick, 485 N.W. 2d at 650; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 39, at 251-53.
13 5Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1005 ("[Iln order for a plaintiff to utilize the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, he must show.., that the evidence sufficiently excludes the inference of his
own responsibility... in causing the accident .... In the case at bar, the body of proof
discounts other possible causes, than that of the negligence of nurse..."); KEETON E7 AL.,
supra note 4, § 39, at 254.
13 6KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 39, at 254.
13 7Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 667-68; KEETON Er AL., supra note 4, § 40, at 257-58.
13 8See Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442; Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004; Fleming, 742 P.2d at 1092;
Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 665-66; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 40, at 257-58.
13 9See, e.g., Scribner, 866 P.2d at 442; Fleming, 742 P.2d at 1092; Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at
665-66; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, 40, at 257-58.
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introduce evidence. If the defendant nurse fails to introduce mitigating
evidence, the nurse takes the chance that the jury will decide against him.140
An additioinal issue is raised when rebuttal or explanatory evidence is
offered by the defendant nurse to show that the harm was not caused by the
nurse's negligence. In such a case, both the res ipsa inference of negligence and
the nurse's exculpatory evidence are to be balanced and weighed by the jury.141
The jury must then determine which is stronger; the jury can either accept or
reject the inference of negligence.142
If the plaintiff introduces evidence of specific acts of negligence or
malpractice by the nurse, is the plaintiff still able to rest on the inference of
negligence provided by res ipsa loquitur? Proving some specific facts does not
necessarily eliminate the natural inferences from others. 143 Accordingly, when
a plaintiff proves some specific acts of negligence or malpractice to explain
what occurred, and when plaintiff's proof does not destroy the inferences that
are compatible with the evidence, a plaintiff can still take advantage of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.144
3. Negligence Per Se
a. Definition
A standard of care may be set by a statute or administrative regulation. When
a statute mandates or proscribes specific acts, a court can interpret the statute
140 Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004; KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 40, at 257-58.
141Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 667 n.11, 668-69.
142 See, e.g., Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004; Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 668-69 (patient alleged that
during intubation accompanying gall bladder surgery, a nurse anesthetist negligently
caused a fracture of two tracheal rings, leading to a permanent tracheotomy; res ipsa was
not applicable because the defendant rebutted any inference that the plaintiff's injury
was caused by the negligence of any defendant); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 40, at
260-61.
143Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1005-06 ("Simply because plaintiff in this case put on some
evidence to attempt to prove the negligence of nurse..., does not deprive her of the
natural inferences of the facts. Plaintiff 'should not be denied the benefit of any natural
inferences which may arise from the occurrence of the accident merely because he does
not care to rest his chances upon that inference alone."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4,
§ 40, at 260.
144 See, e.g., Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 62 ('This is so because proof in a res ipsa loquitur case
seldom points to a single specific act or omission (citation omitted). Typically, it points
to several alternative explanations involving negligence without indicating which of
them is more probable than the other (citation omitted). Hence, a plaintiff may offer
such evidence as may be available tending to show specifically the items of negligence
and still rely upon the inference permitted under res ipsa loquitur" (citation omitted);
Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1006 ("[R]es ipsa loquitur and direct proof of negligence may be
simultaneously submitted to the jury.... [Ilt is not error to allow the jury to be instructed
upon both negligence and the.., presumption of negligence where the plaintiff has
produced evidence of discrete negligence."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 40, at 260.
[Vol. 43:557
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss4/3
THE NURSING PROFESSION IN THE 1990'S
as setting a standard of care and imposing a concomitant duty on members of
a particular group.145 Deviating from the statutory standard of care can be
construed by the court as constituting both the duty and breach elements in a
negligence cause of action.146 When a statute sets forth duties that a nurse is
obligated to fulfill, the doctrine may be applicable to patient injuries sustained
from the nurse's neglect or contravention of the statutory duties.147
The doctrine may also be utilized against a nurse who lacks the necessary
and proper statutory authority to perform an act that results in harm to the
patient.1 48
b. Requirements
A plaintiff must meet three requirements to invoke the doctrine of negligence
per se: (1) the statute must create a clear and definite duty of conduct and must
specify from whom such duty is required; (2) the statute must evidence a
legislative purpose of protecting a limited class or persons of which plaintiff is
a member; and (3) the harm suffered by the plaintiff must be of the type that
the statute aimed at preventing.149 A statute is presumed to anticipate all risks
that reasonably can be foreseen as likely to result from its violation. 150
c. The Effect of Negligence Per Se
Three widespread views discuss the legal effect of the violation of a statutory
duty. The majority of courts hold that once a statute is determined to be
applicable and a transgression of the statute is established, the issue of negli-
145 See, e.g., Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 480 (1st Cir. 1994); Sweet v. Sisters of
Providence, 881 P.2d 304,311 (Alaska 1994); CentralAnesthesia Assocs., 833 S.E.2d at 831,
833; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 36, at 220-21.
146 See Lama, 16 F.3d at 480 (evidence of duty and breach elements were sufficiently
proven via nurse's failure to properly document surgical wound infection as required
by Puerto Rico Health Dept. Reg.); Central Anesthesia Assocs., 333 S.E.2d at 831, 833;
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 36, at 220-27; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 73-74.
14 7See Lama, 16 F.3d at 480-81 (patient developed infection after surgery for herniated
disc; nurse failed to document post-surgical wound infection symptoms in
contravention of a Puerto Rico Health Dept. regulation that required "qualitative
nursing notes" for each nursing shift); Central Anesthesia Assocs., 833 S.E.2d at 831, 833
(student nurse anesthetist improperly administered anesthesia in contradiction of a
state statute); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 73-74; Kelly, supra note 38, at 266.
148 For example, in Central Anesthesia Assocs., 333 S.E.2d at 831, a noncertified nurse
administered anesthesia in violation of a state statute requiring administration of
anesthesia only by a certified registered nurse anesthetist only under the direction and
responsibility of a duly licensed physician. BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 73-74; POZGAR,
supra note 38, at 227 (a nurse may be deemed negligent if he or she performed functions
restricted by law to physicians); Kelly, supra note 38, at 266 and cases cited therein.
14 9KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 36, at 220-27.
1 50 d. at 220-27.
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gence is conclusively decided as a matter of law.151 Other courts, however, view
the doctrine as creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Lastly, some
courts hold that the statutory violation is merely evidence of negligence, upon
which the jury may deliberate in order to determine the appropriate standard
of care and whether or not it was breached. 152
d. Causation and Damages
The effect of negligence per se is to brand the defendant as negligent. A
nurse's demonstrated violation of a statute however, does not automatically
equate to legal liability.153 Although the duty and breach elements are
established by the doctrine, the plaintiff must also prove that the nurse's
violation of the statute was the cause of plaintiff's injuries or harm and plaintiff
must still prove actual damages. 154
E. Causation
1. Introduction
A basic and indispensable element to the plaintiff's negligence or
malpractice action is the existence of a causal connection between the alleged
negligent act or omission of the defendant and the harm to the plaintiff.155 The
causation element should be separated into two distinct causation
requirements: 1) causation in fact and 2) proximate cause, both of which must
be established before liability is imposed. 15 6
1511d. at 229-31.
152ld.
153See Lama, 16 F.3d at 480; Central Anesthesia Assocs., 333 S.E.2d at 831, 833;
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 73-74.
154Lama, 16 F.3d at 481 (We hold that plaintiffs met their burden of proof as to the
allegation that theHospital's [nurses'] substandard record-keeping procedures delayed
the diagnosis and treatment of [patient's] wound infection at a time when controlling
the wound infection was likely to prevent the development of -the more serious
discitis."); Central Anesthesia Assocs., 333 S.E.2d at 833 ("[A] jury would be authorized to
find from plaintiff's expert's testimony that if such [state mandated physician] direction
and responsibility had been provided to, or sought by, nurse..., and endotracheal tube
would have been used instead of a mask, the patient would have been properly
oxygenated."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 36, at 220-27; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at
73-74.
155Gibson v. Bossier City Gen. Hosp., 594 So.2d 1332, 1343 (La. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A]
plaintiff [must] not only prove a breach of the standard of care but also a causal
relationship between thatbreach and the injuries."). See KEETON ETAL., supra note 4, § 41,
at 263.
156Vincent, 862 P.2d at 851 & n.7; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 270.
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2. Causation in Fact
The defendant's negligent act or omission must be the "cause in fact" of the
plaintiff's injuries in order to impose liability.157 Most courts express this
requirement in the form of a rule known as the "but for" test.158 Pursuant to
this test, a nurse's careless act or omission is a "cause in fact" of a plaintiff's
injuries if the harm would not have occurred but for the nurse's conduct.
Conversely, a nurse's careless act or omission is not a cause in fact of the
plaintiff's injuries if the harm would have occurred anyway.159 If the patient's
recovery was highly unlikely from the inception of care, or if the ultimate result
would have been the same regardless of whether the nurse had exercised due
care, then the nurse's careless act or omission is not a cause in fact of the
patient's injuries.160
One problem with the "but for" test is that it can be applied accurately only
when a single health care provider involved in the patient's care is proven to
be the wrongdoer. 16 1 At times, however, a single health care provider cannot
be identified as the only party responsible for the patient's injury or harm.
There can exist two or more forces, acts, or omissions that concur or contribute
to cause the patient's injuries, and any one of these causes, operating alone,
may have been sufficient to produce the same result.162 In such a situation,
regarded as a "contributing," "concurring," or "multiple" causes case, there is a
157 See Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1343; Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d 621, 628 (Mont. 1985);
Kimball, 421 So.2d at 310; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 264-68.
158 Vincent, 862 P.2d at 851; Guilbeaux, 589 So.2d at 631; Rudeck, 709 P.2d at 628; Kimball,
421 So.2d at 310; Daniel, 415 So.2d at 589; Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544; KEETON ET AL., supra
note 4, § 41, at 266.
159 See Ard, 636 So.2d at 1046 (enunciating a causation testwhen a patient dies: plaintiff
mustprove there would havebeen a "chance of survival" and that the patientwas denied
this chance because of the defendant nurse's negligence); Guilbeaux, 589 So.2d at 631;
Rixey, 916 F.2d at 615; Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544; Kimball v. Paul Ins. Co., 421 So.2d 309,
310 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("but for" test not met in patient fall case); Daniel v. St. Francis
Cabrini Hosp. of Alexandra, 415 So.2d 586, 589 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("but for" test met in
patient fall case); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 266; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at
272.
160 See Porter, 995 F.2d at 636 (nurse took infant's vital signs, communicated vital signs
to physician, but nurse did not repeat communication; physician did not order
immobilization of infant, who subsequently suffered partial paralysis); Gill v. Foster,
626 N.E.2d 190,193 (111. App. Ct. 1993); Myers v. Barringer, 398 S.E.2d 615,619 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990) (nurse failed to record and report patient's complaints of hip and leg pain
following electro-convulsive therapy treatments).
161Vincent, 862 P.2d at 851-52; BERNZWEIG, supra note 11, at 272.
162 See Vincent, 862 P.2d at 851-52; Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1018, 1024-25; Manning v.
Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 830 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Idaho 1992) (treating negligence claim
as a "multiple causes or factors" case); Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682-83 (the failure by obstetrics
nurses to determine that a baby was in the breech position was regarded not as the "sole
cause" of injury, but as a "natural and continuous" "concurring cause" which produced
the injury); Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1187-88; Rudeck, 709 P.2d at 628-29.
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need for a broader rule than the "but for" test-if the "but for" test is strictly
applied, the defendant nurse and any other careless, third party health care
providers avoid liability.163 To avoid such a result, a nurse's conduct will be
the cause in fact of the resulting harm if it was a "substantial factor" in
producing the harm. 164 A nurse whose careless conduct was a substantial
factor in causing a patient's injuries is not exonerated because the negligence
or malpractice of another health care provider is also a contributing or
concurring cause;165 and that third person can be held concurrently liable.166
163 Manning, 830 P.2d at 1189 (holding that application of the 'but for" test was
inappropriate in those cases involving multiple causes or factors). In Vincent, 862 P.2d
at 852-53 the patient was admitted to the emergency room for after complaining of
severe abdominal cramps. An emergency room nurse assessed the patient's condition
as not extraordinary, although patient appeared to need fluids. Id. A physician ordered
another emergency room nurse to administer Mepergan intravenously and after doing
so, the nurse briefly left the patient's room. Id. When the nurse returned she found the
patient convulsing. Id. The patient subsequently experienced cardiac arrest and
sustained permanent, debilitating brain damage. Id. The patient alleged that this injury
was caused by emergency room nurses failure to assess and treat her extreme fluid loss.
Id. In response, the defendant's expert, a toxicologist, testified that patient had
experienced a rare allergic reaction to Mepergan. Id. After a jury verdict in favor of
defendants, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the jury was given inconsistent definitions
of a controlling legal rule. The appellate court disagreed:
Had the evidence in the instant case been limited to alleged negli-
gence by nurses and doctors employed by (hospital), then.., a 'but
for' instruction would have been correct. (The hospital), the named
defendant, would bear the legal responsibility for all such acts
(citation omitted). [The hospital], however, introduced evidence and
argued that factors unique to (patient's) physiology were involved
in the emergency room injury. In light of this evidence of another
emergency room force, (patient's) allegedly 'extraordinary' physi-
ology,. . . a concurrent cause instruction was proper (citation omitted).
Id.; see also Rudeck, 709 P.2d at 628-29 ("Bear in mind that the present case involves an
original tort-feasor [surgeon], concurrent tort-feasor [surgical nurses] and a subsequent
tort-feasor [radiologist].... We conclude that the instant case is just such an infrequent
case where the 'but for' is inapplicable and the 'legal cause' ('substantial factor') rule is
the correct instruction to give to the jury."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 266-68.
164 Simmons, 841 F. Supp. at 750 ("[T]o recover for injury, plaintiff must prove that
defendant's conduct was a 'substantial factor' in causing the untoward result."); Vincent,
862 P.2d at 851-52; Atkins, 634 A.2d at 259 (applying "substantial factor" tests to hospital
fall case); Manning, 830 P.2d at 1189 (holding that a nurse's conduct "[n]eed not be the
only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor concurring with some other cause
acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the injury); Rudeck, 709
P.2d at 627 (holding that "if the effect of defendant [surgeon's] negligence in leaving a
foreign object inside his patient's wound actively and continuously acts to cause harm
to his patient, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous negligence of the
nurses [in not counting sponges] is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm
to the patient.").
165 See Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024-25 (finding that an obstetrics nurse was negligent
for failing to assess signs and symptoms of preclampsia (seizure) in a pregnant patient
and for failing to inform physician, even though the physician stipulated that he was
negligent and his negligence was a cause of patient's injuries);Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682-83
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The plaintiff possesses the burden of proving causation in fact. To meet his
burden, the plaintiff must introduce evidence that establishes a reasonably
certain basis for concluding that the nurse's conduct more likely than not
resulted in, was the cause of, or was a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm.167 Mere possibility or speculation of such causation is insufficient, while
absolute certainty is not required. The law instead requires evidence which
would enable reasonable persons to determine the certainty, probability, or
likelihood that the harm was caused by the nurse.168
(obstetrics nurses' failure to detect that the baby was in breech position, which led to
difficult vaginal delivery injuring baby, was regarded as the "proximate cause of injury,
though not sole cause"); Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1187-88 (actions of nurses can be a
'contributing cause" of injuries suffered by a patient who is subsequently misdiagnosed
by a physician because of faulty nursing assessment); Rudeck, 709 P.2d at 627-29.
166 See Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1187-88 (nurses failed to assesss that patient not in labor);
Rudeck, 709 P.2d at 627-29 (surgeon deemed negligent for leaving sponge inside patient
and surgical nurses held to commit malpractice for failing to inform surgeon of
unaccounted-for sponge); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 266-68.
16 7See Porter, 995 F.2d at 636 (holding that expert testimony "was legally insufficient
to establish a causal connection" between the failure of nurses to repeat infant's
abnormal vital signs to physician, physician's decision not to immobilize infant, and
infant's eventual partial paralysis); Harris, 872 S.W.2d at 762-63 (finding "factually
sufficient evidence" was present to conclude that the nurses' failure to cross-check a
prescription with known allergies, as well as a failure to instruct the patient on how to
proceed in the event of an allergic reaction, caused patient's death); Dixon, 431 S.E.2d at
782 ("Reasonable minds could accept from the testimony at trial that the Hospital's
breach of duty [caused by nurse not properly restocking the Code cart] was a cause of
[patient's] brain death, without which the injury would not have occurred."); Wheeler,
866 S.W.2d at 47 ("Had nurses... accurately assessed the status of [plaintiff's] labor and
the breech position of the baby, it is highly likely that [plaintiff] would have been
admitted to the [hospital] for delivery"); Cohen, 592 A.2d at 724 where allegation consists
of improper injections, the testimony of a physician was sufficient "to permit a finding
that an injection had caused the [plaintiff's] wrist drop...."; Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 905-06
(finding "sufficient" evidence that the failure of labor and delivery nurses to perform
proper Doppler monitoring of a fetus resulted in permanent brain damage); Guilbeaux,
589 So.2d at 631 (finding that "plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that,
but for the drain in plaintiff's back, plaintiff probably would not have had two (2)
herniated discs. Although plaintiff had a pre-existing back condition, the defendants'
negligence aggravated his condition and caused his herniated discs."); Gibson, 594 So.2d
at 1343 (plaintiffs failed to sustain burden that baby's death was caused by nurses'
failure to diagnose and treat as opposed to a congenital birth defect); Nastasi v. United
Mine Workers of America Union Hosp., 567 N.E.2d 1358, 1364 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991);
Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18; Hill, 610 N.E.2d at 637; Daniel, 415 So.2d at 589; Garcia, 697
F. Supp. at 1572-73; Haney, 323 S.E.2d at 434; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 269-70.
168 See Porter, 995 F.2d at 632 (establsihing the test for causation in nursing malpractice
cause of action: Did defendant's negligence, "in probability" cause plaintiff's injury);
Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 905-06 (defining causation test as "reasonable medical probability
that plaintiff would have obtained a better result"); Gill, 597 N.E.2d at 783; Guilbeaux,
589 So.2d at 631; Cohen, 592 A.2d at 723-24; Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18; Daniel, 415 So.2d
at 589; Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1572-73; Haney, 323 S.E.2d at 434; KEETON ET AL., supra note
4, § 41, at 269-70.
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Direct or circumstantial evidence, expert testimony, or the common
knowledge of the jury can provide the basis from which the causal connection
can be established. 169 When the causation determination in a nursing
negligence or malpractice case involves information or facts within the
common knowledge or experience of the jury, no expert testimony is required
to demonstrate causation. 170 If, however, the matter is a complex medical
matter, expert testimony is required to provide a sufficient basis for the causal
connection. 171 The expert will need to testify that, in his or her professional
169See, e.g., Ard, 636 So.2d at 1044-47 (establishing causation through testimony of
patient's spouse concerning patient's deteriorating physical condition and lack of
response by nurses to calls for attention); White, 633 So.2d at 758-59 (causation
established by testimony of family members, autopsy report, and expert testimony);
Harris, 872 S.W.2d at 762-63 (causation element established in part by testimony of
physician and expert nurse witness); Cohen, 592 A.2d at 723-24 (causal connection
established by physician testimony, plaintiff's testimony, and plaintiff's physical
condition); Hill, 610 N.E.2d at 637 (causal connection established by physician
testimony, Physicians Desk Reference which was entered into evidence, plaintiff's
testimony, and plaintiff's physical condition); Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544 (causation issue
is a question of fact for jury); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 269-70.
1 70 KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 41, at 269-70.
17 1See White, 633 So.2d at 758-59 (discussing Physician's expert testimony that if
patient's symptoms of breathing difficultyhad notbeen overlooked bynurses, tests may
have prompted the doctors to take steps which could have prevented disorder, which
caused the patient's death.); Ard, 636 So.2d at 1046-47 (physician expert testified that
nurses' failure to observe and assess patient lessened patient's chances for survival);
Vincent, 862 P.2d at 849 (defendant's physician expert, a toxicologist, testified that
patient's heart attack and brain damage were caused by a rare allergic reaction to
medication and not by Emergency Room nurses failure to assess and treat patient's
extreme fluid loss); Baptist Medical Ctr., 618 So.2d at 1339 ("[Physician's] testimony...
provided the jury with adequate evidence to allow it to find that the... failure to detect
and to report to the [physician] the symptoms of uterine rupture and the hospital's
failure to reactproperly to a fetaldistress situation proximately caused [patient's child's]
death."); Dixon, 431 S.E.2d at 782. Plaintiff's expert witness, (physician), testified that the
hospital employees' breach of duty, in not being prepared to promptly reintubate
[patient], caused [patient's] brain death; St. Paul Med. Ctr., 842 S.W.2d at 814
("[Physician], a specialist in maternal-fetal medicine, testified that the nurse was
negligent in failing to render adequate care in monitoring [baby] and detecting his
hypoxia which subjected him to prolonged insult and delayed his delivery. He further
stated that application of the EFM by a nurse with proper training would have detected
[baby's] condition and would have required his delivery"); Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 105;
Treinis v. Deepdale Gen. Hosp., Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (1991) (physician expert
testified that nurses' failure to immediately administer Nipride to patient after surgery
for repair of torn Achilles tendon was of no consequence and that patient's death was
caused by a rare tumor that was not discovered until his death); Guilbeaux, 589 So.2d at
631 (physician testified that nurse's leaving strip of drainage tube in plaintiff's back
probably caused plaintiff's herniated discs); Roach, 585 N.E.2d at 1079, 1080-81 (nurse
expert testified that nurses breached standard of care by failing to notify attending
physician of abnormal fetal heart tones shown by monitoring system, but "failure to
notify" instruction was refused because no expert testimony was presented to show that
the nurses' failure caused the baby's brain damage from lack of oxygen); Gibson, 594
So.2d at 1343 (physician experts testified that baby's death was caused by congenital
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opinion, the nurse's negligence or malpractice, in all reasonable medical and
scientific certainty or probability, caused or resulted in the patient's injury.172
3. Proximate Cause
a. Introduction and Overview
Even if the harm would not have happened "but for" the nurse's negligence
or malpractice, liability does not ensue automatically. In addition to
demonstrating that the nurse's conduct was the cause in fact of plaintiff's
injuries, the successful plaintiff must also show that the nurse's conduct was
the "proximate" or legal cause of the injuries. 173 The proximate cause doctrine
birth defect as opposed to nurses' failureto diagnoseand treat); Cohen, 592 A.2d at 723-24
(physician's testimony established causal connection between nurse giving an
intramuscular injection of Demerol and Vistaril, allegedly by wrong technique and in
wrong site, and patient's sudden wrist drop and injury to radial nerve); George v. LDS
Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117, 1121-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (defendant argued that patient
inevitably would have died of sepsis and that any negligence on the nurses' part in not
notifying physician of patient's deteriorating condition was not a proximate cause of
patient's death; but plaintiff's physician experts testified that sepsis may be reversible
and treatable and did not occur instantaneously in patient's case); Plutshack, 316 N.W.2d
at 8 (where a nurse assisted a physician in performing a lumbar puncture of baby to
determine if the babyhad Meningitis; the nurse was notliabile in partbecause the record
contained no expert testimony that the nurse's conduct, even if negligent, could have
directly caused baby's cardiac arrest); Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 655-56; Sweeney, supra note
28, at 36-37.
172 See Porter, 995 F.2d at 633 (expert testimony must establish a "probability, not a
mere possibility, of a causal connection.... The use of phrases such as 'could be,' 'could
very well be,' or 'could possibly be,' is generally fatal to allegations of ... causation.");
Baptist Medical Ctr., 618 So.2d at 1338-39;Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 105 (discussing physician
testimony as to causation and "specific causal link" between nurses' negligence,
physician's faulty diagnosis, and patient's death); Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 905-06
(physician expert testified that had labor and delivery nurses engaged in proper
monitoring of fetus, baby's brain damage "probably" would have been prevented);
Guilbeaux, 589 So.2d at 631; Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 655-56 (physicians testified that the cause
of respiratory arrest was improper monitoring by recovery room nurse and a failure to
ascertain drugs administered); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18 ("The plaintiff's expert
specifically testified that, to a degree of medical and scientific certainty, [patient's] life
could have been saved if Narcon was administered at 11 p.m. following her collapse.");
Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36-37.
173 See, e.g., Baptist Medical Ctr., 618 So.2d at 1339; Dixon, 431 S.E.2d at 781-82
(discussing nurses' breach of duty in not having the code cart properly restocked,
resulting in a three minute delay in the intubation of patient, proximately caused
patient's brain death); Smith, 637 So.2d at 1181-83 (holding that nurses' breach of duty
of care in not properly observing and restraining confused, disoriented patient was
proximate cause of patient's death in vehicle accident.); Miles, 489 N.W.2d at 838, 841;
Fein, 695 P.2d at 675 (proximate cause present when nurse practitioner misdiagnosed
patient's chest pain as muscle spasm, and patient suffered heart attack); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 41, at 263-64.
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requires the existence of a reasonably close connection between the careless act
or omission of the nurse and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.174 Proximate
cause is not a question of factual causation since the "proximity" issue arises
only after cause in fact is established.175
b. The Foreseeability Approach
The most troublesome and contentious aspect of the proximate cause
doctrine is the defendant's liability for unforeseeable, unusual, or remote
consequences stemming from the defendant's admittedly careless act.176 Since
the law deems it unjust to hold a defendant legally responsible for all the
consequences of his or her wrongful conduct, proximate cause serves as a legal
device to limit the scope of the defendant's liability to certain consequences. 177
The seminal proximate cause issue, therefore, concerns how far a defendant
nurse's legal liability will extend for the consequences factually caused by his
or her careless conduct.
To answer this question, courts have developed the "foreseeability" rule. This
rule limits the nurse's liability to the foreseeable consequences of his or her
careless conduct. 178 It is a fundamental policy of the law that a defendant is not
to be held liable for consequences which no reasonable person could anticipate
or expect to follow from the conduct in question, regardless of the causation
pattern.179
c. Intervening Cause
Occasionally, when employing the foreseeability rule an "intervening cause"
will be found to have played a part in creating plaintiff's injury. An intervening
cause is some force, actor, or event of independent origin which comes into
active operation after the negligence of the defendant and either extends the
174Miles, 489 N.W.2d at 841; KEETON Er AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 263-64.
1 7 5 KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 43, at 280-81.
176See, e.g., Smith, 637 So.2d at 1181-83 (Was unusual manner of confused, disoriented,
and "bizarrely" acting patient's death caused by patient leaving ward, making his way
through ER, driving away in an ambulance, and fatally crashing, proximately caused
by nurses' failure to observe and restrain?); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 43, at 280-81.
177 Smith, 637 So.2d at 1181-83; KEETON ET AL, supra note 4, § 41, at 263-64.
178 See, e.g., Smith, 637 So.2d at 1181, 1183; Harris, 872 S.W.2d at 762-63; Dixon, 431
S.E.2d at 781-82; Simmons, 841 F. Supp. at 750; George, 797 P.2d at 1122; Lopez, 833 P.2d
at 1185; Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 606; Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at 622; KEETON ET AL., supra
note 4, § 43, at 280-81; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 68; but see Fein, 695 P.2d at 675 (when
nurse practitioner misdiagnosed patient's chest pain as a muscle spasm in failing to
order EKG. Consequently patient suffered heart attack).
179See Simmons, 841 F. Supp. at 750; Dixon, 431 S.E.2d at 782; Koeniger, 422 N.W.2d at
606; Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at 622; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 43, at 280-81, 84.
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results of defendant's negligence or combines with the defendant's negligence
to produce the injury.180 The intervening cause in a nursing negligence or
malpractice case very likely will be careless human conduct, particularly the
medical malpractice of a physician.181
The problem emerges as to whether a nurse is liable for harm she did in fact
contribute to, but where the harm is also produced by a later intervening cause
of independent origin for which the nurse was not responsible?182 The
intervening cause doctrine, generally regarded as an extension of the proximate
cause doctrine, provides a legal solution for determining ultimate tort
responsibility.183 The key question is whether the nurse is to be excused from
responsibility because his or her culpability has been superseded by a
subsequent, independent, intervening event. 184
One important rule for determining intervening cause is the standard of
"foreseeability." Under the rule, a nurse will be held liable if the subsequent
180NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 567-69; Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1187-88; Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d
at 625; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 44, at 301.
181For cases discussing the combined negligence of nurses and physicians, NKC
Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 567-69 (nurses negligent for failing to observe and assess
pregnant patient in "extreme" abdominal pain and for failing to question discharge of
patient while patient's personal physician misdiagnosed patient's condition and
ordered discharge); Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024-25; Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625 (labor and
delivery nurse either failed to observe or recognize signs of fetal distress; physician was
alleged to be negligent in diagnosis and treatment); Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1187-88; Miles, 489
N.W.2d at 841 (nurse failed to accurately describe fetal heart rate pattern; and physician
failed to diagnose baby's hypoxic state and fetal distress); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at
602-03 (physician and nurses discharged post-operative patient with elevated
temperature).
182 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024-25; NKC Hospitals, Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 567-69;
Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625; Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1188; Miles, 489 N.W.2d at 841; KEETON ET
AL., supra note 4, § 44, at 301.
183Miles, 489 N.W.2d at 841; Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1188; Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625; KEETON
ET AL., supra note 4, § 44, at 301-02.
184 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024-25 (malpractice of physician); NKC Hosps., Inc.,
849 S.W.2d at 568 (misdiagnosis by patient's personal physician); Miles, 489 N.W.2d at
841 (nurse failed to accurately describe fetal heart rate pattern, but physician failed to
diagnose baby's hypoxic state and fetal distress); Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1188; Fairfax, 419
S.E.2d at 625 (hospital argued that negligence of labor and delivery nurse in failing to
observe or recognize signs of fetal distress was "remote" and that negligence of physician
was the "intervening and independent" conduct that was the "immediate cause" of the
injury); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602-03 (patient recovering from urological surgery
discharged with elevated temperature. "There is contradictory expert testimony as to
whether the surgery, the infection, or a combination of the two resulted in [patient's]
death .... Hospital had the burden and did not demonstrate that the physician's alleged
negligence superseded any negligence by the Hospital [nurses] and was the sole
proximate cause of [patient's] death'); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 44, at 301-02;
BARBARA E. CALFEE, NuRsEs IN THE COURTROOM 210-11 (1993).
19951
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
intervening cause is deemed reasonably foreseeable. 185 If the intervening cause
is one which the nurse reasonably ought to have anticipated and taken into
account, the intervening cause cannot be deemed "supervening," "efficient," or
"superseding"; and the nurse is liable.186 Similarly, if the intervening cause is
within the scope of the original risk entailed by the nurse's conduct, or
reasonably connected to it, or reasonably influenced by it, the intervening cause
is not a "superseding," "supervening," or "efficient" one; and the nurse's liability
is not terminated.187 However, if an independent intervening cause is present,
and it is one which the nurse neither could foresee nor control, the nurse's
conduct, even if careless, cannot be deemed to be the sole, self-producing,
immediate, "efficient," and thus "proximate" cause of the patient's injury.188
d. The Jury's Role
Proximate cause and intervening cause issues require the application of legal
standards, such as the "foreseeability" test, to the facts of the case. Accordingly,
they are regarded as factual questions for the jury to decide.189
18 5NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 568 ("[Ijf the resultant injury is reasonably
foresee4ble from the view of the original actor, then the other factors causing to bringabout the injury are not a superseding cause."); Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625 ("remoteness"
test); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, i 44, at 302.
18 6NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 568-69 ("[F]oreseeability by the original or
antecedent actor negates an otherwise superseding cause [the physician]; Miles, 489
N.W.2d at 841 ("An efficient intervening cause is the intervening negligence of a third
person who has full control of the situation, and whose negligence could not have been
anticipated, and which negligence breaks the causal connection between the original
negligence and the injury" (citation omitted)); KEETON, ET AL., supra note 4, § 44, at
303-04.
187 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024-25; Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1185,1187-88; Koeniguer,
422 N.W.2d at 602-03; KEETON, ET AL., supra note 4, § 44, at 302-04.
188See Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024-25 ("In order to break the [causation] chain, the
intervening negligence of the physician must be disconnected from the negligence of
the [nurse] and must be of itself an efficient, independent, and self-producing cause of
the patient's injury.").
189See, e.g., Miles, 489 N.W.2d at 841 (where nurse failed to accurately describe fetal
heart pattern, and physician failed to diagnose baby's hypoxic state and fetal distress,
"presented a question of fact as to proximate cause."); Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625 ("[T]here
was abundant, credible evidence which the jury was entitled to accept, establishing that[nurse's] breach of the standard of care was a proximate cause of the injuries and
damages sustained.... It was for the jury to say whether these breaches by [nurse]
constituted an efficient cause of the loss suffered by the plaintiffs."); Koeniguer, 422
N.W.2d at 606 (proximate cause regarded as question of fact for jury); Polonsky, 418
N.E.2d at 622 (jury could infer that elderly patient under medication and unrestrained
would become confused and disoriented and that nurse should have anticipated fall);
KEETON, ET AL. supra note 4, § 45, at 320.
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F. Damages
Negligent conduct, in and of itself, does not establish the the nurse's liability.
Once the negligent act and causation elements are established, the plaintiff
must still show the essential element of damages in order to prevail. Although
a nurse may have breached a duty owed to a patient, no liability for negligence
will be imposed if the plaintiff has not sustained damages; i.e., an injury or
harm.190
Damages are designed to compensate, that is, to restore the plaintiff patient,
inasmuch as possible, to his or her condition before the harm occurred.1 91
Damages are defined as (1) special damages such as economic losses, medical
and hospital expenses, future medical care, lost wages and wage earning
capacity, business profits, future expenses, and loss of support,
companionship, and comfort; and (2) general damages or damages deemed
inherent in the injury itself, such as pain and suffering, mental anguish,
emotional distress, and awards for disfigurement, physical impairment and
disability.192
If a nurse acts in a grossly negligent, wanton, reckless, consciously
indifferent, malicious, or oppressive manner, a jury may impose additional
damages on the nurse to punish him and to deter others from engaging in such
flagrant misconduct. 193
190See Wyatt v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 868 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ark. 1994)
(where nurse disclosed information to a third party that either patient had AIDS or was
being tested for it, there was no cause of action for medical malpractice since revealing
confidential information not regarded as a "medical injury"); Benninger, supra note 12,
at 1295.
19 1BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 273.
192 See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hosp., 883 S.W.2d at 442 (awarding damages for pain and
mental anguish, loss of earning capacity, disfigurement and physical impairment, and
future medical care); Manning, 830 P.2d at 1188 (allowing for an award of emotional
damages in cases where nurses, despite requests and strenuous urgings of family
members present, refused to provide elderly "no code" patient with a portable oxygen
unit during relatively short move to a private room, and patient died shortly thereafter);
Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 658-62 (damages included loss of earning capacity, out-of-pocket
expenses, and awards for disability and impairment, pain and suffering, and loss of
enjoyment of life).
193See, e.g., Manning, 830 P.2d at 1190-91 (holding that the punitive damage standard
encompasses conduct which is an extreme deviation from reasonable standards,
conduct which shows a disregard for likely consequences, and malicious, oppressive,
fraudulent, or grossly negligent conduct.); Hodges v. Virginia Employment Comm'n,
355 S.E.2d 104,107 (employing a "conscious indifference to consequences" standard, the
court found that a jury "could reasonably conclude from the evidence presented that
the failure of the nurses to convey actual knowledge of [patient's] heart condition and
medication evinces that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a
conscious indifference to the consequences."); Scribner, 866 P.2d at 440-41 ("A party may
be held liable for punitive damages under the 'wanton or reckless disregard' standard
if the party is shown to be 'aware of or culpably indifferent to unnecessary risk of
injury."'); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 158-59 and cases cited therein.
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Punitive damages, however, are relatively rare in nursing negligence cases
since the nurse is inspired by a desire to help, comfort, and heal patients. A
nurse's conduct, even if careless, is seldom sufficiently flagrant to warrant the
imposition of punitive damages. 194
G. Defenses
Contributory negligence is careless conduct on the part of the plaintiff that
contributes to his or her own injury. In those states still employing it,
contributory negligence is a harsh doctrine that acts as a complete defense to
recovery regardless of how slight the plaintiff's negligence.195
In most jurisdictions, however, the defense of contributory negligence has
been abolished and replaced by the doctrine of comparative negligence. 196
Comparative negligence acts not as a complete bar to recovery but rather as a
method of reducing plaintiff's recoverable damages. The jury first makes a
finding of each party's fault, assigns a percentage of fault to each party, and the
plaintiff's damages are reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to
plaintiff.197
When a patient is wholly or partly responsible for causing his or her own
injury, a nurse may raise these legal defenses to preclude or lessen liability.198
A competent patient, for example, may not cooperate, refuse to follow a
physician's or nurse's order or instruction, leave the hospital against medical
advice, refuse or neglect prescribed treatment or medication, meddle with
equipment, provide false, misleading, or incomplete information, or otherwise
engage in careless, non-compliant, reckless, or fraudulent conduct.199 A
194 FIEsTA, supra note 48, at 158.
1 95BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 293-94, 96.
196 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 4, § 67, at 468-70.
19 7BERNzwEIG, supra note 13, at 296.
198 See, e.g., Oxford, 438 S.E.2d at 172 (comparative negligence charge appropriate in a
medical malpractice cause of action where plaintiff fails to disclose fully all information
relevant to her condition); Jensen, 459 N.W.2d at 186 ("Consequently, to be considered
as and constitute contributory negligence in a medical malpractice action, a patient's
negligence must have been an active and efficient contributing cause of the injury, must
have cooperated with the negligence of the malpractitioner, must have entered
proximate causation of the injury, and must have been an element in the transaction on
which the malpractice is based."); Bartimus, 458 N.E.2d at 1080; Patricia W. Iyer & Nancy
Hand Camp, Legal Aspects of Charting Techniques, NURSING DOCUMENTATION: A NURSING
PROCESS APPROACH 90-91 (1991) (importance and procedure of documenting patient's
potentially contributorily negligent acts); Jane Greenlaw, Failure to Use Siderails: When
Is It Negligence, 10 LAw, MEDICINE, AND HEALTH CARE 125,126-27 (1982) and cases cited
therein; Walker, supra note 100, at 46.
199See, e.g., Oxford, 438 S.E.2d at 172 (discussing patient's failure to provide relevant
information to nurses); Hackathon v. Lester E. Cox Medical Ctr., 824 S.W.2d 472, 475
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (as a result of patient's refusal to allow a nurse to check heat pad,
patient was burned); Bartimus, 458 N.E.2d at 1080 (where evidence showed that the
plaintiff may have failed to use due care in leaving the hospital ... against the advice
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plaintiff may be wholly or partly responsible for causing her injury when,
contrary to instructions, she gets out of bed unattended or tries to climb over
siderails.200 Comparative and contributory negligence will likely fail as
defenses when a patient is confused, disoriented, dazed, or otherwise impaired
since the patient's condition is a key fact that the nurse knows or should know,
thereby requiring the reasonable nurse to take special precautions to safeguard
the patient.201 Moreover, a patient will not be deemed contributorily negligent
when his or her conduct supplies the reason for the medical treatment, which
later becomes the subject of the lawsuit, or when the patient contributes to a
medical condition which causes the patient to seek medical care, which later
becomes the subject of the lawsuit.202
H. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability is the legal doctrine which decides that, by reason of some
relation existing between two parties, the negligence of one party is to be
charged against the other party even though the latter party has played no part
in the careless conduct, has done nothing whatsoever to aid or encourage it, or
indeed has done all it possibly could to prevent the harm.203 The doctrine is
sometimes called imputed negligence or respondeat superior.204
The most common relationship cited to invoke vicarious liability is that
between employer and employee. Once it is determined that a person at work
is an employee, the employer becomes subject to vicarious liability for the
employee's torts committed within the course or scope of employment.205
As most nurses work for hospitals or other health care providers that possess
the power and right to control and supervise the nurse's actions, a nurse will
be regarded as an employee of the hospital or health care provider.206 The
of [physician]... the evidence supported the court's decision to instruct the jury on
comparative negligence.); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 3 and cases cited therein; Walker,
supra note 100, at 46.
200 Greenlaw, supra note 198, at 126-27 and cases cited therein.
201See, e.g., Tobia, 643 A.2d at 2, 4 ("We hold that when a health-care professional's
duty includes exercise of reasonable care to prevent such a patient [85 year old] from
engaging in self-damaging conduct, the health care professional may not assert
contributory negligence as to a claim arising from the patient's self-inflicted injuries.");
Greenlaw, supra note 198, at 127.
202Jensen, 459 N.W.2d at 187 ("Any conduct on [patient's] part before he was admitted
to [hospital] and which mayhavecausally contributed tohis demisewasnota proximate
cause [of the] alleged malpractice in medical treatment at hospital.").
203KEEToN, ET AL., supra note 4, § 69, at 499-501.
204 d. at 499.
205 Id. at 501.
2 06Morris, 597 N.E.2d at 1113; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 34-35; Sweeney, supra note 28,
at 37; Morris, supra note 28, at 128-29.
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liability for a nurse's negligence or malpractice, therefore, is not a matter that
pertains only to the nurse. The nurse's employer207 may also be liable for the
nurse's careless acts or omissions.
Although the nurse will be sued in an individual capacity for the harm
resulting from his or her negligence or malpractice, it is also likely that the
plaintiff will attempt to reach the more financially capable employer by means
of the vicarious liability doctrine.2 08 The careless nurse, however, is not relieved
of liability. The hospital is permitted, and may attempt in a separate lawsuit,
to recover from the nurse employee any monetary damages vicariously
incurred by the hospital in connection with the nurse's negligence or
malpractice. 209 Vicarious liability, therefore, is not a shield to nursing
negligence and malpractice liability.
III. TYPES OF NURSING NEGLIGENCE
A. Introduction
Nurses perform a variety of advanced medical procedures for their patients.
Any one of these nursing activities may result in harm to a patient and thus
maybe the subject of a lawsuit. This section will focus on particular problematic
aspects of the nursing profession. Caselaw will be examined and analyzed to
ascertain the distinct and exacting duties of care that a nurse owes to a patient,
to illustrate the recurring practical problems that nurses presently confront,
and to explain the nurse's potential tort liability based on these specific
responsibilities.
B. Administration of Medication
The administration of medication is one of the most frequent functions of
the nurse, and no other aspect of nursing care involves more risk.
Consequently, medication errors are a common area of nursing negligence and
malpractice and thus comprise a major source of legal action against nurses.210
207For information concerning hospital liability see Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1020;
DeLaughter, 601 So.2d at 824-25; Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 104; McClain, 602 So.2d at 242;
Morris, 597 N.E.2d at 1112; Brown, 588 So.2d at 1299; Rixey, 916 F.2d at 615; Daniel, 415
So.2d at 589; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 37; Vallot, supra note 38, at 99 and cases cited
therein; Greenlaw, supra note 72, at 118 and cases cited therein; Garlo, supra note 45, at
270-72 and cases cited therein. For information concerning other employees see Adams,
856 P.2d at 865 (physician employer liable for misdiagnosis by nurse practitioner
employee who diagnosed patient's condition as genital herpes instead of severe yeast
infection); Hill, 610 N.E.2d at 636 (medication technique error by nurse employee of
university); HEITLAND, ET AL., supra note 94 (responsibility of physician for malpractice
of nurse specialist pursuant to Illinois law).
208 Scanlan, supra note 38, at 227; Morris, supra note 28, at 123.
209 Garlo, supra note 45, at 273.
21OGayle Hacker Sullivan, Five "Rights" Equal 0 Errors, RN 17 Aug. 1994 (Supp.); LOEB
& CAHILL, supra note 5, at 123 and cases cited therein; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 49-50 (and
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Medication errors arise in a wide variety of circumstances. A nurse may
commit an error in policy or practice by failing to follow procedural
safeguards. 211 He or she may, for example, fail to review a patient's record to
determine whether a drug order has been modified,212 fail to read the drug
label three times, 213 fail to confirm on a twenty-four hour basis that a
physician's order for medication remains operative, 214 or fail to contact a
physician to re-issue, confirm, or alter a preoperative medication order after
the patient undergoes surgery.215 A nurse must possess a basic knowledge
about medications; he or she must be familiar with drug warning indications,
effects, complications, risks, and contraindications. A nurse who ignores or
lacks such fundamental information and knowledge about a medication he or
she administers subjects himself or herself to liability.2 16 A nurse is also legally
liable for giving the wrong medication to a patient,217 giving the right
medication to the wrong patient,218 administering medication at the wrong
time, at incorrect intervals, or on a delayed basis.219
A nurse is expected to know the correct dosages of medication and is liable
if the wrong dose is given to a patient.220 The prudent nurse should compare
cases cited therein); POZGAR, supra note 38, at 238-43 and cases cited therein.
2 11See Hodges, 355 S.E.2d at 106-07 (emergency room nurses failed to take history of
medications and to obtain information on medication regularly being taken by patient);
Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34-36; Reilly, supra note 28, at 16 and cases cited therein.
2 12 poZCAR, supra note 38, at 241-42 and cases cited therein.
213 Reilly, supra note 28, at 16 and cases cited therein.
21 4Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36.
215Id.
216See, e.g., Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544-45 (finding that "[tihe nurse [did not] approach
her duties with a proper understanding of the hemorrhage-prone vulnerability of a
Heparinized patient." Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at 622 (nurse negligent in not understanding
damages incurred when administering the sleeping drug Dalmane to an elderly patient
recovering from a heart attack); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 50-51 (and cases cited therein;
LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5 at 29-30, 125 [and cases cited therein]; Michael A. Salatka,
Professional Liability in Critical Care Nursing, 19 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 85, 94-95 (1992);
Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34-36; Reilly, supra note 28, at 16 and cases cited therein.
217FIETA, supra note 48, at 50-51 and cases cited therein; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5,
at 216; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 239-40 and cases cited therein; Vallot, supra note 38, at
99 and cases cited therein; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 79.
218LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 216; Salatka, supra note 216, at 94-95; POZGAR, supra
note 38, at 243; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 79.
219Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 17-18 (Failure to give patient medication at prescribed
intervals was breach of standard of care); Guarriello, supra note 11, at 79-80.
220Jensen, 459 N.W.2d at 181 (involving nurse's failure to correct a physician's
incorrectly ordered dosage); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 50-51 [and cases cited therein]; LOEB
& CAHILL, supra note 5, at 216; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34, 36; POZGAR, supra note 38,
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the dosage prescribed by the physician with the dosage indicated on the
medication administration record.221
The correct mode, route, site, or technique for administering medications
must be used in order to avoid liability.222 The prudent nurse should ascertain
the route or technique ordered by the physician, or contemplated by the nurse,
and compare it with the route or technique indicated in a physician's or nursing
medication reference source.223
Misreading a drug order,224 failing to observe or to obtain the effects of a
medication,225 and failing to discontinue medication226 are also other sources
of liability for the nurse.
In addition, failing to properly document the administration of medication
subjects the nurse to liability.227 Each medication ordered by the physician
should be transcribed onto the medication administration record and charted
accordingly, including the dose and time given.228 Failure to chart the medica-
at 240 and cases cited therein; Vallot, supra note 38, at 101 and cases cited therein;
Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80.
22 1Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80.
222 See, e.g., Hill, 610 N.E.2d at 637 (finding nurse committed malpractice by injecting
Kenalog with wrong technique and in wrong route); Deese, 416 S.E.2d at 128 (no
negligence where nurse complied with applicable standard of care regarding site
selection when giving intravenous injections); Morris, 597 N.E.2d at 1116-17; Fleming,
742 P.2d at 1090,1099 (alleging that injection of Talwain and Atarax by emergency room
nurse precipitated patient's injury because injection was not given deep into the muscle
as intended); Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34-36; POZGAI, supra note 38, at 241 (and cases
cited therein); Vallot, supra note 38, at 99 [and cases cited therein]; Reilly, supra note 28,
at 16 [and cases cited therein]; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80.
223 See Hill, 610 N.E.2d at 637 ("The Physicians Desk Reference ... which was entered
into evidence, states that '(u)nless a deep intramuscular injection is given, local atrophy
is likely to occur.' Additionally, this reference material recommends the use of 'alternate
sites for subsequent injections [of Kenalog.]' [T]he plaintiff testified that both injections
were given in the same general area of the upper quadrant of the right buttock.");
Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80.
224 See LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 29-30 and cases cited therein; Reilly, supra note
28, at 16 and cases cited therein.
2 25 See, e.g., Hodges, 355 S.E.2d at 106-07 (finding that emergency room nurses breached
their standard of care by not taking the vital signs of patient after the administration of
medication); Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544-45 (nurse failed to observe and recognize
hemorrhage at needle puncture sites, which is a "major known complication" and "well
known" risk of use of the anticoagulant drug Heparin); Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at 622;
Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34,36; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 243.
226pozGAR, supra note 38, at 242.
22 7See Suire, 590 So.2d at 622 (involving nurse's failure to the administration of the
drug Mandol; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 50-51 and cases cited therein; Vallot, supra note
38, at 99; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 79.
228 Guarriello, supra note 11, at 79.
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tion indicates that it was not given.229 If the nurse properly administers the
correct medication and the patient reacts adversely thereto, the nurse must
document the patient's reactions thoroughly and also include information
regarding any nursing interventions performed. 230 In evaluating a medication
negligence or malpractice case, documentation, or the absence thereof, is an
extremely important factor in determining liability.
23 1
If a drug order is incomplete, confusing, illegible, or otherwise unclear, the
prudent nurse will not attempt to interpret the order, but will instead seek out
the physician and clarify.2 32 The nurse's duty is to detect ambiguities,
inconsistencies, and contradictions and to bring them to the attention of the
physician.23 3 Failure to check with the physician for clarification or corrections
of a medication order exposes the nurse to liability.234 If a drug order is
contradicated because it contains abnormally high dosages, incompatible
medications, or conflicts with the patient's allergies or physical condition, the
prudent nurse will refuse the order and immediately seek corroboration from
the prescribing physician or other health care provider as indicated by hospital
policy.23 5
Physicians often call in telephone orders. Such verbal orders are particularly
dangerous when the order concerns the administration of medication. A nurse
should document the order as precisely as the physician gives it and then repeat
the order back to the physician so as to confirm the order.236
Many other safeguards exist that are designed to protect against medication
errors and these safeguards are commonly recognized as part of nursing
practice. There is the long-standing "five rights" safeguard, advising the nurse
22 9See Suire, 590 So.2d at 622; Harrington; 569 N.E.2d at 17-18 (absence of entries on
patient's medical chart indicates that no medications were given to the patient during
the night); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 50-51.
23 0LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 126.
23 1Vallot, supra note 38, at 99 and cases cited therein.
2 32Sullivan, supra note 210, at 17; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 57; LOEB & CAHILL, supra
note 5, at 125; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36; POzGAR, supra note 38, at 240; BERNZWEIG,
supra note 13, at 175.
2 33Harris, 872 S.W.2d at 762-63; Sullivan, supra note 209, at 17; Sweeney, supra note
28, at 36.
2 34Harris, 872 S.W.2d at 762-63; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 29-30 and cases cited
therein; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 172; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 240 and cases cited
therein; Reilly, supra note 28, at 16 and cases cited therein.
2 35Harris, 872 S.W.2d at 763 (Expert nurse witness "[tiestified that after a doctor has
seen a patient and written a prescription, it is the discharge nurse's independent duty
to compare the prescription with the patient's chart for contradictions and to bring any
inconsistencies to the attention of the doctor to clarify or correct."; Sullivan, supra note
210, at 18; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 126; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36.
236Sullivan, supra note 210, at 17; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 120-121; LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 124; Sweeney, supra note 26, at 36; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 249.
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to administer the right drug, to the right patient, at the right time, in the right
dosage, and by the right route.237 In addition, there is the "three checks"
safeguard, which counsels the nurse to check the medication before removing
it from its container, check the medication before administering it, and check
the medication after giving it.238 Ignoring or contravening any of these safety
procedures can subject the patient to detrimental medical consequences and
the nurse to adverse legal consequences.
The administration of medications is an integral part of the health care
delivery system. The law recognizes the nurse's essential role in the
administration of medication and requires that the nurse discharge his or her
responsibility in a careful manner.
C. Observation and Monitoring
In the course of discharging their functions, nurses are exposed to a great
deal of information regarding a patient. Nurses are often in an exclusive
position with regard to receiving patient information. Physicians obviously
cannot observe or monitor patients on a regular basis. Nurses, however, serve
as adjuncts to physicians by observing and monitoring patients.239
Accordingly, nurses have a duty to ca*refully monitor and observe the patient
and to report any signs, symptoms, abnormalities, deterioration, or changes in
the patient's condition and behavior.240 This duty extends to listening to a
237 Sullivan, supra note 210, at 17; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 122; Sweeney, supra
note 28, at 34-36.
238Sweeney, supra note 28, at 34, 36.
239See Sweet, 881 P.2d at 307 (narrative nursing notes referred to as "eyes and ears of
the doctor"); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18 ("There is no dispute that [nurses] had a duty
to monitor [patient's] vital signs, to observe [patient's] breathing patterns.. . during the
night and to advise [patient's] physician of any significant changes."); Sweeney, supra
note 28, at 36.
240 See, e.g., Feeney, 615 N.E.2d at 587 ("The minimum standard of care on the nursing
side called for monitoring the respiratory rate of this [manifestly drunk] patient every
15 minutes; this 'would more likely have permitted the nursing staff to observe changes
in this patient's breathing patterns and/or the onset of respiratory arrest,' [according to
expert nurse witness]."; Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 63 ("[Tjhe failure to recognize and report
abnormalities in the treatment and condition of patients may constitute a breach of the
duty of reasonable care."); Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 905 (labor and delivery nurses failed to
perform proper monitoring of fetus and failed to recognize abnormalities in patient's
labor); Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1342 (parents of deceased baby alleged that neonatal nursery
nurses failed to properly observe and monitor baby and failed to timely diagnose and
treat their baby's hypoglycemia); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18 ("[nurses] had a duty to
monitor [patient's] vital signs, to observe [patient's] breathing patterns during thenight
and to advise [patient's] physician of any significant changes."); Parker, 540 So.2d at 1274
(nurses complied with duty to circulate throughout nursery and to observe newborns);
Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1572-73 ("Plaintiff had undergone major surgery earlier on the
day and constant monitoring was necessary. When plaintiff... took a turn for the worse
[around 7:00 p.m.], a serious medical emergency was clearly evident."); Haney, 323
S.E.2d at 433 (emergency room nurse failed to monitor plaintiff's blood pressure and
other vital signs when plaintiff's condition worsened); Belmon, 427 So.2d at 54-45; Battles,
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patient and not ignoring information provided by the patient and his or her
family.241 The failure to adequately observe and monitor, therefore, is a form
of negligence or malpractice for which the nurse is liable.242
D. Assessment and Diagnosis
A medical diagnosis is an evaluation of a patient's health condition for the
purpose of instituting an affirmative course of treatment or therapeutic
measures.243 Such a diagnosis is clearly within the realm of the practice of
medicine and reserved for physicians, and is not the responsibility of the
nurse,244 except in limited emergency situations or if specifically authorized
430 So.2d at 314; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 126 and cases cited therein; Sweeney, supra
note 28, at 36; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 235 and cases cited therein.
2 41 See, e.g., White, 633 So.2d at 758-59 (nurses committed malpractice by overlooking
family members' communications that patient was experiencing recurring breathing
difficulty and that the patient had collapsed and lost consciousness); Ard, 636 So.2d at
1045-46 (alleging that nursing staff did not timely respond to wife's calls for assistance,
during which time patient's condition deteriorated); McClain, 602 So.2d at 243 (nurse
noted and communicated patient's complaints of pain); Brown, 588 So.2d at 1300
(alleging nurse's failure to record a "significant part of patient history"); FIESTA, supra
note 48, at 134.
242See Ard, 636 So.2d at 1045-46; Feeney, 615 N.E.2d at 587 (emergency room nurse
committed malpractice for failure to observe and monitor); Smith, 637 So.2d at 1186
(nurses breached duty of care by not continuously observing confused patient); Berdyck,
613 N.E.2d at 1018-19,1023 (obstetrics nurse failed to comply with physician's order to
keep patient quiet and to observe her blood pressure); Galloway, 602 So.2d at 1010
(nursing staff failed to observe and investigate patient's "noticeable" symptoms); Fairfax
Hosp. Sys., 419 S.E.2d at624-25 ("The evidence established that [labor and delivery nurse]
either failed to observe or to recognize the signs of fetal distress); DeLaughter, 601 So.2d
at 824-25 (nurses deemed negligent for failing to appropriately observe 70 year old
woman who was admitted to ICU in confused state, with unintelligible speech, elevated
blood pressure, and abnormal heart rhythms); St. Paul Med. Ctr., 842 S.W.2d at 814
(failure to monitor baby and detect hypoxia); Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648 (nurse anesthetist
committed malpractice for not monitoring the position of plaintiff's arm during
surgery); Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 905-06; Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18; (ICU nurses failed
to properly monitor patient's condition and failed to detect presence of subcutaneous
air in patient's body); Haney, 323 S.E.2d at 433 (failure to monitor plaintiff's blood
pressure and other vital signs when plaintiff's condition worsened); Garcia, 697 F. Supp.
at 1572-73 (nurses negligent in part for not performing "constant monitoring" of patient
who had undergone major surgery earlier in the day); Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 658; Belmon,
427 So.2d at 544-45; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 126 and cases cited therein; Sweeney, supra
note 28, at 36; Reilly, supra note 28, at 16-17 and cases cited therein; Scanlan, supra note
38, at 235 and cases cited therein.
24 3Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1023; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 156, 248.
24 4See, e.g., Biddle, 518 N.W.2d at 799-800 (no liability on part of emergency room
nurses because nurses do not have a duty to determine whether a patient should be
admitted, order tests, diagnose a patient, or document what they believe is an incorrect
diagnosis); Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1023 ("The law imposes on the physician the exclusive
duty to diagnose the patient's adverse health condition and to prescribe a course of
treatment for its management and care .... The standard of conduct required of a nurse
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by statute, such as in the case of the nurse practitioners.245 Traditionally, it has
long been unlawful for a nurse to make a medical diagnosis of a patient's
condition. A nurse that does so runs the risk of having illegally exceeded the
scope of his or her license to practice.246
A nurse is, however, authorized to make a nursing diagnosis or
assessment.247 A nursing diagnosis or assessment is the nurse's evaluation and
interpretation of the patient's signs and symptoms, changes, abnormalities,
deterioration, actual or potential health problems, risk factors, responses and
reactions to treatment or any nursing or medical regimen, factors (physical,
mental, behavioral, socioeconomic) that may influence the physician's
diagnosis and treatment and the patient's recovery, and a determination of
what further nursing intervention is necessary.248
A nursing diagnosis is not a medical diagnosis; the nurse is neither initiating
a medical examination, making a medical judgment about a patient's condition
or disorder, ordering tests, recommending appropriate procedures or
treatment, nor altering the patient's medical treatment or regimen.249 With this
cannot include the process of medical diagnosis and treatment, which is reserved to the
physician."); Ewing, 532 So.2d at 881 ("[I1t is not a nurse's job to diagnose arrest of labor
.... [M]aking a diagnosis invades the function of a physician."); Paris, 331 S.E.2d at 245
(Nurse's . . . duty to disobey [the instructions of a physician] does not extend to
situations where there is a difference of medical opinion.... Any disagreement or
contrary recommendation [a nurse] may have had as to the treatment prescribed would
have necessarily been premised on a separate diagnosis, which she was not qualified to
render."); Vassey, 262 S.E.2d at 867 (contending that emergency room nurses committed
malpractice by not making a diagnosis of appendicitis).
2 45 See Adams, 856 P.2d at 865 (misdiagnosis by nurse practitioner); Heitland, supra
note 94, at 26 (authority of nurse practitioner to diagnose and prescribe pursuant to
Illinois Nursing Act); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 156, 248.
24 6HEITLAND ET AL, supra note 94, at 24-26; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 227; BERNZWEIG,
supra note 13, at 156, 248.
24 7 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 964.003(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) ("practice of professional
nursing" includes "assessment" and "nursing diagnosis"); Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1342-43;
LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 14; Salatka, supra note 216, at 86; BERNZWEIG, supra note
13, at 156-57.
248 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1022; Garcia. 697 F. Supp. at 1572-73 ('The nursing
staff should have recognized the emergency nature of the situation... and deteriorating
condition.. " of patient who had undergone major surgery earlier in the day.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 464.003(d) (West Supp. 1995); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 14;
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 156-57; Reilly, supra note 28, at 10; Garlo, supra note 45, at
277-78 and cases cited therein; Salatka, supra note 216, at 86.
249 Downey, 835 S.W.2d at 556 ("nothing in [precedent] imposes a duty on nurses to
review the records of a patient's consent to surgery and to intervene during the course
of the surgery if the surgeon begins to exceed the bounds of such consent. Gill, 597 N.E.2d
at 782 ("[niurses do not diagnose patients' maladies or practice medicine .... "; Vassey,
262 S.E.2d at 867-68 (finding that it is not emergency room nurses' responsibility to make
an examination of the patient, order and take blood tests, and make a diagnosis of
appendicitis.); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 14,38; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 157.
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distinction in mind, a prudent nurse will avoid giving his or her opinion when
a patient questions the nurse about the patient's medical problem and will
avoid offering information or suggestions as to possible courses of
treatment.250
When a nurse makes a nursing diagnosis or assessment, he is expected to do
so carefully and his failure to do so properly is a form of negligence or
malpractice.251
The nursing/physician dichotomy presents two problems for nurses: the
law fails to define precisely what a nursing diagnosis or assessment means; and
the law fails to distinguish clearly between a medical and nursing diagnosis.
252
As nurses assume more responsibility for patient care, the amount of indepen-
250See Vassey, 262 S.E.2d at 867-68 (emergency room nurse incorrectly concluded that
patient was not suffering from appendicitis and nurse stated this erroneous conclusion
to physician, but there was no nursing liability because diagnosing is a physician duty);
LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 216-17.
25 1See, e.g., Ard, 636 So.2d at 1045-46 (nurses breached standard of care by failing to
properly assess the patient); Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1022 (obstetrics nurse failed to
recognize signs and symptoms of preclampsia [seizures] in pregnant patient); Simmons,
841 F. Supp. at 750 (concluding that evidence showed nurses failed to "be alert to
recognize infections" at intravenous needle sites, but that no liability would adhere
because the plaintiff failed to present evidence on causation); Wheeler, 866 S.W.2d at 46,
n.19 (nurses committed malpractice by failing to make correct assessment of pregnant
patient's condition); Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1185,1187-88 (nurses committed malpractice by
failing to assess patient correctly); Fairfax, 419 S.E.2d at 625 (labor and delivery nurse
failed to recognize signs of fetal distress);Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682 (failure to detect baby's
breech position in time for doctor to perform a cesarean delivery); Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d
at 904-06 (labor and delivery nurses failed to recognize that patient's labor was
abnormal); St. Paul Medical Ctr., 842 S.W.2d at 814 (nurse failed to detect baby's hypoxia,
resulting in "prolonged hypoxia insult," delayed delivery, and brain damage); Eyoma,
589 A.2d at 658 (nurse failed to detect that patient had stopped breathing); George, 797
P.2d at 1120 (nurse expert" [tiestified that the nurses breached their duty by failing to
perform a neurological assessment of [patient] when [patient] showed discemable signs
of respiratory distress .... '); Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1572-73 (finding that nursing staff
should have recognized the emergency nature of the situation and that the lack of
expeditious medical attention to this seriously ill patient was below applicable standard
of nursing care); Bartimus, 458 N.E.2d at 1076 (emergency room nurse failed to properly
assess plaintiff's condition); Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544-45; Barbara E. Calfree, "Litigation
Lessons," NURSING 94 Jan. 1994, at 47 and cases cited therein; Calfee, supra note 96, at
40-42 and cases cited therein; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13,
at 157; Garlo, supra note 45, at 277-78 and cases cited therein; Greenlaw, supra note 117,
at 79; but see Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1342-43 ("After reviewing the record, we find the
evidence does not support a finding that nurse ... breached the applicable standard of
care .... There was no evidence.., that nurse... had overlooked [babys] risk factors.")
252 See, e.g., Lopez, 833 P.2d at 1185, 1187-88 (nurses committed malpractice by failing
to "assess" that patient was not in labor); Gibson, 594 So.2d at 1342-43 (terms "assessment"
and "diagnosis" used by court in a nursing malpractice case concerning the failure of
neonatal nursery nurses to detect hypoglycemia in infant); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note
5, at 14, 38.
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dent patient diagnosis judgment afforded nurses surely will increase.253 The
result may be an overlap of medical and nursing functions.254
Critical care and emergency room nurses already have assumed a diagnostic
role to ensure that their units are functioning properly.255 In the emergency
room, for example, the triage nurse is responsible for determining, based on
his or her nursing assessment and diagnosis, which patients immediately need
to be evaluated by a physician and which can wait for an evaluation. The
existence of "standing orders," moreover, may permit nurses to make a medical
diagnosis and initiate and alter treatment.256 The blurring of medical and
nursing functions raises the issue as to whether the nurse is engaging in a
medical procedure and, if so construed, the nurse must be aware that he or she
will be held to the standard of care, not for nurses, but for physicians. 257
E. Communication, Notification, and Reporting
In the course of observing and monitoring patients and equipment, nurses
have come to possess a great deal of information regarding patients. Because
of their proximity to the patient, nurses frequently are in exclusive control of
patient information and thus are the only health care providers that can
communicate the information.258 Effective communication, therefore, is an
essential aspect of the nurse's responsibilities. Accordingly, a nurse has a duty
253 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 38; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 232.
254 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1023 (nevertheless, "the fact that a particular act is
within a physician's duty of care does not necessarily exclude it from the duty of care
owed to the patient by the nurse. Depending on the facts and circumstances, the same
act may be within the scope of their separate duties of care because it is, coincidentally,
within their respective standards of conduct."); see also Fein, 695 P.2d at 674 ("the
'examination' or 'diagnosis' of a patient cannot in all circumstances be said-as a matter
of law-to be a function reserved to physicians, rather than registered nurses or nurse
practitioners."); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 38; Salatka, supra note 216, at 96-97 and
cases cited therein; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 227; Greenlaw, supra note 72, at 120.
255 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 38; Salatka, supra note 216, at 96-97 and cases cited
therein; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 227; Greenlaw, supra note 72, at 120.
256 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 39; Garlo, supra note 45, at 256.
257 See Alvis, 592 N.E.2d at 682 (physicians testifying as to standard of competency of
OB nurses regarding ability to determine if baby in breech position); Gibson, 594 So.2d
at 1342; Cangelosi, 564 So.2d at 661 ("Nurses who perform medical services are subject
to the same standards of care and liability as are physicians."); Keys, 485 So.2d at 517-18
(nurse anesthetist held to intubation standards as set forth by physician
anesthesiologist); Belmon, 427 So.2d at 544 ("Nurses ... who undertake to perform
medical services are subject to the same rules relating to the duty of care. ... as are
physicians in the performance of those professional services."); Greenlaw, supra note 72,
at 120.
258 Roach, 585 N.E.2d at 1080 (nurses failed to notify attending physician of abnormal
fetal heart tones shown by monitoring system); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18; Greenlaw,
supra note 117, at 79; Scanlan, supra note 36, at 236-37.
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to communicate relevant information regarding the patient to the physician or
other health care providers.259
As the nurse's role expands, the nurse will be deemed responsible for
collecting, processing, and evaluating a mass of critical information and
findings concerning a patient.260 The nurse is then legally responsible for
exercising careful judgment to decide what information should be reported to
a physician or other health care provider.261 For example, the nurse has a duty
to report, to the more remotely located physician, vital information regarding
the patient and to promptly notify the physician of any abnormalities,
deterioration, or significant changes in the patient's condition or behavior.
262
2 59See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1021-22; Brown, 588 So.2d at 1300; Roach, 585 N.E.2d
at 1080 ("Nurse ... was qualified by plaintiffs as an expert on obstetrical nursing
practice. She testified after having examined monitoring data with regard to
[patient].... She expressed an opinion that ... proper nursing procedure would have
required nurses in attendance to immediately notify the physician involved of the
irregularities in the fetal heart beats being recorded. This testimony provided expert
proof of the standard of care involved and of breach of that standard."); Harrington, 569
N.E.2d at 18 ("There is no dispute that [nurses] had a duty to monitor [patient's] vital
signs, to observe [patient's] breathing patterns during the night, and to advise [patient's]
physician of any significant changes."); George, 797 P.2d at 1121 ("Courts have also
recognized that a nurse may have a duty to notify her supervisor that a life threatening
situation exists and that failure to perform this duty may be a proximate cause of
plaintiff's additional injury" (citation omitted); Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1572-73. Contra
Battles, 430 So.2d at 314; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 118-19 and cases cited therein;
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 162, 164 and cases cited therein; POZGAR, supra note 38, at
248-49 and cases cited therein; Greenlaw, supra note 117, at 77-79; Guarriello, supra note
11, at 80; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 236-37; Morris, supra note 28, at 120-21 and cases cited
therein; but see Miles, 489 N.W.2d at 839 ("When a physician is present at a hospital and
is seeing a patient and when the physician is clearly aware of available information
which may be relevant to the diagnosis and treatment of that patient, it is unreasonable
to require hospital personnel to make sure that the physician does, in fact, review that
information.").
2 60BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 162, Greenlaw, supra note 117, at 79.
2 61See Vassey, 262 S.E.2d at 868 (holding that emergency room nurse did not commit
malpractice by failing to communicate to physician that plaintiff's mother "suggested"
appendicitis as plaintiff's disorder, even though nurse erroneously concluded
otherwise.)
262 See, e.g., Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 63 (failure to report "abnormalities" in the treatment
or condition of patients or "changes in a patient's condition" may constitute a breach of
the duty of reasonable care); Roach, 585 N.E.2d at 1079-81 (evidence and testimony that
nursesbreached standard of care bynotnotifying attending physician of"irregularities"
and "abnormalities" in fetal heart tones shown by monitoring system); Harrington, 569
N.E.2d at 18 (nurses breached standard of care by failing to inform patient's physician
that patient, dependent on Darvocet after leg amputation and admitted in "poor" and
"groggy" condition in order to undergo detoxification program, had collapsed and
passed out on bathroom floor during the night; Haney, 323 S.E.2d at 433 (emergency
room nurse failed to report a rise in patient's pulse); Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1572 ('The
nursing staff should have recognized the emergency nature of the situation and taken
prompt steps to notify attending physicians); Battles, 430 So.2d at 314 (nurses contacted
head nurse after observing that patient, who had undergone a thyroidectomy, had
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This duty need not be premised on the physician explicitly telling the nurse to
keep him or her informed; the physician must be advised of vital information,
changes, or abnormalities regardless. 263 The failure of a nurse properly to
communicate relevant information to a physician or other health care provider
is a breach of the nurse's duty of care--subjecting him to liability for negligence
or malpractice.2 64
Communication, therefore, is an essential component of nursing practice
and successful health care. The reasonably prudent nurse must possess careful
observation skills as well as the capability to assess carefully the patient's
condition and to know when a change therein warrants the prompt notification
of the physician.265 In order to ensure reasonable care and to avoid legal
developed restlessness and a "slight wheeze"; head nurse detected stridor, indicating
breathing problems, and "immediately" contacted anestheologist; and "within one
minute" of conversation with physician, emergency room physician was summoned by
nurse); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 118-19 and cases cited therein; POZGAR, supra note 38, at
248-49 and cases cited therein; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 162, 164 and cases cited
therein; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80; Greenlaw, supra note 117, at 77; Scanlan, supra
note 38, at 236-37; Morris, supra note 28, at 120-21 and cases cited therein.
263 See Hodges, 355 S.E.2d at 106-07; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80.
264 See Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1017,1021-22 (finding nurse negligent for failing to report
to physician pregnant patient's severe upper abdominal pain, nausea, headaches,
inability to pass urine, and elevated blood pressure); Baptist Medical Ctr., 618 So.2d at
1338-39; Wheeler, 866 S.W.2d at 46-47 (nurses committed malpractice by failing to inform
physician of the reasons for the absence of information regarding pregnant patient and
by failing to discuss with physician nurse's inability to determine baby's position or
presenting part); Myers, 398 S.E.2d at 619 (nurses failed to record and report patient's
complaints of hip and leg pain following electroconvulsive therapy treatments--no
liability because the patient made the very same complaints of pain to his treating
physician); Rixey, 916 F.2d at 615 (ICU nurses failed to advise treating physician of
existence of subcutaneous air reflected in patient's x-ray as well as the increasing
quantities of subcutaneous air in patient's body); Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 18 (Nurses
breached standard of care by failing to inform patient's physician of patient's collapse);
George, 797 P.2d at 1121 (physician not notified that patient, taken to ICU for an
angiogram, was incoherent, disoriented, febrile, having difficulty breathing, and in
deteriorating mental and physical condition, that patient's blood pressure was unable
to be determined, and that nurses had difficulty in making patient bleed for a glucose
test); Hodges, 355 S.E.2d at 106-07 ("nurses ... failed to record and relay to the physician
information concerning the decedent's complaints of stomach pain, that decedent had
a heart condition, and that decedent had taken a nitroglycerin pill shortly before her
arrival at the hospital"); Haney, 323 S.E.2d at 433 (nurse breached standard of care by
failing to report a rise in the patient's pulse and by erroneously telling a physician that
the patient had not been given Librium when in fact he had); Rudeck, 709 P.2d at 627-29
(surgical nurses committed malpractice by failing to inform surgeon of unaccounted-for
sponge); Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1572-73; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 248-49 and cases cited
therein; Greenlaw, supra note 117, at 79; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 236-37; Morris, supra
note 28, at 122.
26 5See Rixey, 916 F.2d at 615; Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1572-73 (finding that "standard
and appropriate medical attention dictated immediate notification of the physicians.");
FIESTA, supra note 48, at 118-19,121 and cases cited therein; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at
164 and cases cited therein.
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liability, the nurse must discharge his or her communication duty and the nurse
should document these communication efforts.266
Communication is a fundamental component to nursing practice.
Regardless of how competent the physician or other health care provider, a
patient's safe and successful treatment and care cannot be ensured unless the
nurse capably fulfills his or her communication function.
F. Following and Questioning Orders
A physician treating a patient customarily writes orders to direct the
patient's medical care plan. The responsibility of the nurse to execute such
orders has long been recognized as a basic nursing duty.2 67 A physician who
gives a direct and explicit medical order to a nurse is entitled to count on his
or her order being complied with in a prompt and competent manner.
268
Accordingly, a nurse is expected to obey a physician's order without
question.26
9
Fundamental nursing responsibility dictates that the nurse be held to a
general legal duty to execute a physician's order.270 The failure to carry out a
physician's order, as a general rule, is a form of nursing negligence or
malpractice.271 When the nurse does follow a physician's order, however, the
nurse generally is protected from liability.272 These two related general rules
266 See Morse, 450 S.E.2d at 256-57; Suire, 590 So.2d at 621; Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1573
("Reasonable care for a patient in plaintiff's [post-operative] condition requires
communication, coordination, and documentation by health care professionals -
physicians and nursing staff.").
2 67jensen, 459 N.W.2d at 182-83; Sparks, 768 P.2d at 775 ("The record is replete with
evidence indicating that the standard of care applicable to St. Luke's personnel... is
simply to follow the attending physician's orders.").
2 68See Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 658; Jensen, 459 N.W.2d at 181-83.
2 69Benninger, Note, Nursing Malpractice-The Nurse's Duty to Follow Orders, 90
W.VA.L. REV. 1291, 1293 (1988); Garlo, supra note 45, at 257.
2 70See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. Gary Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841,847 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992);Jensen, 459 N.W.2d at 183 ("As a general rule, hospital staff memberslack authority
to alter or depart from an attending physician's order for a hospital patient and lack
authority to determine what is a proper course of medical treatment for a hospitalized
patient"); Eyoma v. Fako, 589 A.2d 653, 658 (N.J. Super. 1991); Hurlock, 709 S.W.2d at
881 ("[M]embers of... hospital's nursing staff were required, by accepted nursing
practice, to 'document' in [patient's] medical records compliance with the admitting
physician's order to turn the patient every two hours.").
271 See, e.g., Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 843,847; Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1018-19,1023 (OB
nurse failed to comply with physician's order to keep patient quiet and to observe her
blood pressure closely); Eyoma, 589 A.2d at 658; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 143;
POZGAR, supra note 38, at 246 and cases cited therein; Benninger, supra note 60, at 1294,
1300 and cases cited therein; Garlo, supra note 45, at 255; Reilly, supra note 28, at 16 and
cases cited therein; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 232-33 and cases cited therein.
272 See Georgetti v. United Hosp. Medical Ctr., 611 N.Y.S.2d 579,584 (1992) ("It is clear
that when an attending physician gives direct and explicit orders to hospital staff, nurses
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would seem to indicate that since a failure to comply with orders is evidence
of negligence or malpractice, the reasonably prudent nurse merely should
follow such orders273 and should document compliance in the medical
records. 274
Merely following orders, however, may be insufficient for the nurse to meet
her duty of care--the law may require more than blind, rigid, obedience to a
physician's order. 275 In certain exceptional situations the nurse's compliance
with an order may be deemed unreasonable conduct, and thus evidence of
nursing negligence or malpractice.276 The nurse may be liable even if he or she
contacts the physician who restates the order277 or relies on the physician's
assertion that the physician will take full responsibility.278
The law requires that the nurse exercise his or her independent professional
judgment and intelligence, investigate and inspect for potential dangers,
perform a competent nursing assessment of the patient's condition, evaluate
the appropriateness and reasonableness of a physician's order, and evaluate
the order's potential for causing harm to the patient.279 The nurse, rather, is
held to a superseding, independent, legal duty to safeguard the well-being of
the patient.280 In certain exceptional circumstances the law will impose a duty
on the nurse to refrain from carrying out a physician's order,281 to question the
are not authorized to unilaterally depart from them, and, thus, a hospital is normally
protected from tort liability if its staff follows orders (citation omitted); Sparks, 768 P.2d
at 775, 779.
2 73 BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 69; Benninger, supra note 60, at 1300-01.
2 74 Hurlock, 709 S.W.2d at 881.
2 75NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 569 ('The defense that the hospital's nurses were
only following a 'chain of command' by doing what [was] . .. . ordered is not
persuasive."); Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1023 ("[Mierely following the orders of a physician
is not the full extent of the duty of care owed to a patient by a nurse (citation omitted).
In order to satisfy that duty to its full extent, a nurse must perform a competent nursing
assessment of the patient's condition according to the standards of conduct required of
a nurse. . . .'); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 102, 106; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 69, 144;
Benninger, supra note 269, at 1300-01, 1305-06 and cases cited therein; Guarriello, supra
note 9, at 81; Walker, supra note 100, at 45 and cases cited therein.
276 See, e.g., NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 568-69; FIESTA, supra note 46, at 104-06 and
cases cited therein; BERNZWEIG, supra note 11, at 69, 144; Benninger, supra note 269;
Walker, supra note 100, at 45 and cases cited therein.
2 77Guarriello, supra note 11, at 81.
278FIESTA, supra note 48, at 102.
2 79 NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 568-69; Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1023; Koeniguer, 422
N.W.2d at 604; Vallot, supra note 36, at 99; Benninger, supra note 269; Armstrong, supra
note 5, at 586-87 a cases cited therein.
28OId.; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 69; Vallot, supra note 38, at 99; Benninger, supra
note 269.
281NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 569 (physician misdiagnosed patient's condition
and ordered discharge of patient in "extreme pain," despite nurse's "grave
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order,282 and at times to actually disobey a physician's order.283 If the nurse
knows, or should know, that the order is likely to cause the patient harm, a
nurse cannot claim that he or she was just doing his or her duty by following
the order.284
If an order is incomplete, uncertain, inaccurate, or unclear, a nurse must
refrain from executing the order.285 When an order is obviously improper,
inappropriate, erroneous, or wrong, the nurse must not comply with the
order.286 If an order is not in accord with accepted medical standards, practices,
customary procedures, hospital policies, or regulations, the nurse must defer,
question, and even contravene the order.287 Should a nurse believe that
executing an order would pose a clear risk of harm to the patient, he must not
comply with the order.288
Clarification, correction, or completion of the order from the physician may
resolve potential problems.2 89 In doing so, of course, the nurse must follow any
reservations.") 'The [nurses] ... could readily foresee the injury would directly flow
from [physician's] negligent conduct and the [nurses] had all the time and means in
which to correct it.'); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 69; Benninger, supra note 269, at 1303
and cases cited therein.
282 BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 144; POZGAR, supra note 36, at 249; Benninger, supra
note 269; Walker, supra note 100, at 45 and cases cited therein.
283 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024 (Nurse-expert witness "testified that a
reasonably prudent nurse who observed these repeated high blood pressures would
take action to override the physician's orders and invoke the necessary treatment
protocol"); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 104-06 and cases cited therein; LOEB & CAHILL, supra
note 5, at 248; but see Paris v. Kreitz Jr., P.A., 331 S.E.2d 234, 245 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
("While a nurse may disobey the instructions of a physician where those instructions
are obviously wrong and will result in harm to the patient (citations omitted), the duty
to disobey does not extend to situations where there is a difference of medical
opinion .. ").
2 84NKC Hosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 569; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 69; Benninger,
supra note 269.
2 85FIESTA, supra note 48, at 102; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 216; Benninger, supra
note 269.
286 See Paris, 331 S.E.2d at 245 (applying "obviously wrong" standard); LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 216, 248; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 143, 150; POZGAR, supra note 38, at
249; Benninger, supra note 269; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 81.
28 7See, e.g., Vogler, 624 N.E.2d at 63 ("If a nurse ... fails to... question a doctor's order
when [it is] not in accord with standard medical practice and the omission results in
injury to the patient, the hospital will be liable for its [nurse] negligence."); Paris, 331
S.E.2d at 245; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 102; Benninger, supra note 269; POZGAR, supra note
38, at 249.
2 88See, e.g., Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 604 (applying "danger sign to the well-being of
any patient" standard); Paris, 331 S.E.2d at 245; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 102; LOEB &
CAHILL, supra note 5, at 216; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 143, 148, 150; POZGAR, supra
note 38, at 249; Benninger, supra note 269.
2 89LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 216, 247-48; BERNZWEIG, supra note 11, at 150;
POZGAR, supra note 38, at 239; Benninger, supra note 269; Reilly, supra note 28, at 16 and
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hospital policies regarding clarification and should document his or her efforts
to clarify.290 If after attempting clarification and confirmation, the order is not
properly clarified, confirmed, or corrected, the nurse is obligated not to carry
the order out.291 If the physician insists that the nurse obey the order, despite
being advised of potential problems, the nurse should delay executing the
order and immediately report the matter to the nurse's supervisor, and, if
necessary, to another physician or another responsible hospital official.2 92 To
do so, of course, a nurse must be familiar with the relevant hospital
procedures, 293 documenting all of his or her communication with the physician
and others and making a record of her refusal to comply and the reasons
therefor.294
The duty to question and to refuse the order of a physician adds a new
dimension to the responsibilities of the nurse. As nurses continue to possess
greater degrees of education, training, knowledge, and skill, the law is
permitting and requiring that nurses exercise their independent professional
judgment in an arena previously unsanctioned-that is, to assess the adequacy
of care provided by a physician. This new responsibility certainly enhances the
status and prestige of the nursing profession, but also significantly increases
the nurse's legal duties and potential for negligence and malpractice liability.
G. Intervention and Advocacy
Nurses have a duty to avoid causing harm, or allowing harm, to a patient.295
A nurse's actions in implementing a medical regimen, therefore, may be
insufficient to fulfill this duty.296
A nurse has a specific duty to intervene and act as a patient advocate if the
care provided to a patient is lacking, inadequate, or detrimental.297 In executing
cases cited therein; Scanlan, supra note 38, at 233 and cases cited therein.
290 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 216, 247-48; Iyer and Camp, supra note 198, at 82.
29 1Reilly, supra note 28, at 16 and cases cited therein.
292 NKCHosps., Inc., 849 S.W.2d at 567-69; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 102,106; BERNZWEIG,
supra note 13, at 145, 148, 158; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 249; Benninger, supra note 269;
Guarriello, supra note 11, at 81.
293 FIESTA, supra note 48, at 106.
294LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 148; Iyer & Camp, supra note 198, at 90-91
(discussion of questioning and refusing medication orders and the documentation
thereof).
295Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36.
296 Benninger, supra note 269, at 1306-07 (and cases cited therein).
2 97See, e.g., Poluski, 877 S.W.2d at 712-13; Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024; Hatley, 859
S.W.2d at 367,379; DeLaughter, 601 So.2d at 824-25; Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602; FIEsTA,
supra note 48, at 102; Sweeney, supra note 28, at 36; Benninger, supra note 269, at 1306-07
and cases cited therein; Reilly, supra note 28, at 17 and cases cited therein; Guarriello,
supra note 11, at 81; Walker, supra note 100, at 45 and cases cited therein.
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this duty the nurse may need to call the absence, inadequacy, or impropriety
of care, to the attention of health care providers and authorities.298 The failure
to notify the proper providers and authorities that, as a result the lack of proper
care, a patient is being harmed, or is threatened with harm, is a form of nursing
negligence or malpractice. 29 9
Nursing intervention and advocacy, particularly when questioning the
competency of a physician, is a very sensitive legal, moral, and practical issue.
Nonetheless, the nursing standard of care may demand such intervention and
advocacy--even if the physician is the one unwilling or unable to act.
300
In discharging his or her legal duty, the prudent nurse will comply with any
relevant hospital guidelines.30 1 Typically, he or she should confront the
treating, attending, or managing physician and, in the absence of a satisfactory
response, the nurse should advise and consult with the charge nurse, the
nursing supervisor, the director of nurses, other hospital administrators, the
patient's personal physician, other managing physicians, or other staff
physicians.
302
H. Documentation and Charting
The patient's medical records are an integral and essential part of the
patient's health care. A primary purpose of the records is to document patient
care. The records also serve as an important means of communication and
guide among all the health care providers involved in the patient's treatment
and care. The duty to maintain thorough and accurate records describing the
patient's condition, treatment, and care has long been recognized as one of the
nurse's fundamental responsibilities.
2981d.
299Id.; see also Gill, 597 N.E.2d at 782.
300 See, e.g., DeLaughter, 601 So.2d at 824-25; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 246-47; Sweeney,
supra note 28, at 36; Reilly, supra note 28, at 17 and cases cited therein; Walkersupra note
110, at 45 and cases cited therein; but see Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024 ("A nurse who
concludes that an attending physician has misdiagnosed a condition or has not
prescribed the appropriate course of treatment may not modify the course set by the
physician simply because the nurse holds a different view. To permit that conduct
would allow the nurse to perform tasks of diagnosis and treatment denied to the nurse
by law" (citation omitted); see also Downey, 835 S.W.2d at 555-56.
3 01poZGAR, supra note 38, at 248.
302 See, e.g., Berdyck, 613 N.E.2d at 1024 ("[T]he nurse is not prohibited from calling on
or consulting with nurse supervisors or with other physicians on the hospital staff.");
Hatley, 859 S.W.2d at 379 (psychiatric charge nurse failed to follow the "nursing chain
of command" and contact a nursing supervisor or doctor when "overmedicated and
depressed" patient threatened suicide with a specific plan for carrying out the threat);
DeLaughter, 601 So.2d at 825 (expert nurse witness testified that if a nurse has a problem
in getting a physician, the nurse should call a "backup" physician or the patient's own
personal physician; and if there is still not a satisfactory response after this sequence of
events, the nurse is then to call the Director of Nurses); Sweeney, supra, note 28, at 36;
Benninger, supra note 269, at 1306-07.
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Documentation is so vital to health care that, from a legal standpoint, the
documentation of care has become equivalent to the care itself.303 If an action
has not been documented, the law may presume or infer that the action was
not performed.30 4 Documenting in an inadequate, inaccurate, or incomplete
manner may, therefore, result in legal liability.30 5
303See, e.g., Harrington v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes, 569 N.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1990)
(noting that the absence of entries in a patient's medical records indicates that nothing
had been done for the patient during the night); Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1573 ("[Tihe lack
of information on the charts contributes to this court's conclusion that [patient's] status
was not timely and sufficiently communicated to the attending physicians."); Koeniguer,
422 N.W.2d at 602 (nurses are liable for failing to document the patient's elevated
temperature); Fran Martin, Documentation, NURSING 94 June 1994, at 63 (describing
documentation as the "pivotal part of lawsuit" and the "best way" for a nurse to refute
a charge of malpractice); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 217, 238-39; Reilly, supra note
28, at 18.
304 See Sweet, 881 P.2d at 308 ("Just as the missing records may have impaired the
[plaintiff's] ability to prove medical negligence, they would in the same way impair the[plaintiffs'] ability to prove a causal connection between any negligence and [patient's]
injuries. It is for this very reason that a number of courts in other jurisdictions have
created a rebuttable presumption shifting the burden of persuasion to a health care
provider who negligently alters or loses medical records relevant to a malpractice claim"(citations omitted); DeLaughter, 601 So.2d at 329; Harrington, 569 N.E.2d at 17-18 (finding
that absence of entries in patient's chart indicated that nothing had been done forpatient
during the night; nurses committed malpractice for failing to monitor, contact physician,
and give medication); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602 (nurse's liable in part for failing to
document that patient's elevated temperature was reported to physician on day of
patient's discharge); Hurlock, 709 S.W.2d at 881 (finding that failure to 'document'
"compliance with the admitting physician's order gave rise to the inference that [patient]
was not turned every two hours [pursant to physician's order] by virtue of the adage
or maxim "if it wasn't written down, it wasn't done."'); LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at
217,238-39; Reilly, supra note 28, at 18; but see Biddle, 518 N.W.2d at 800 ("For the hospital,
expert emergency room physicians... and emergency nurse. . ., each testified that the
nursing staff's documentation exceeded the requisite standard of care for an emergency
room setting. They asserted that in the emergency room the primary communication
between doctors and nurses is verbal, not written.").
305 See, e.g., White, 633 So.2d at 758-59 (nurses committed malpractice by failing to
record that patient experiencing recurring breathing problems, including coughing and
struggling to catch breath, and thatpatient collapsed and lost consciousness); Butterfield,
831 P.2d at 105 (emergency room nurses failed to document a complaint of blue
discoloration and the necessity to stimulate the child in order to make her breathe;
Brown, 588 So.2d at 1300 ("possibility that the knife blade had broken off in [patient's]
shoulder was a significant part of patient history that should have been charted by
[nurse] to whom [patient] and his parents said they reported it."); Garcia, 697 F. Supp.
at 1573-74 ("While the insufficiency of these charts did not by themselves cause
[patient's] injuries, the lack of information on the charts contributes to this court's
conclusion that [patient's] status was not timely and sufficiently communicated to the
attending physicians."); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602 (finding that a nurse failed to
document that the condition of and drainage from patient's incision was reported to
physician and that patient's elevated temperature on day of discharge was reported to
physician); MaryP. Neubauer, Careful Charting Your Best Defense, RN, Aug. 1994 at 19-20.
Martin, supra note 303, at 63-64 discusses four common problem areas in documentation:
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Few would dispute that there are many difficulties involved in
documentation. What a nurse writes in a chart often ends up as an issue in a
negligence or malpractice case. To avoid potential liability, the prudent nurse
should always be aware of relevant documentation standards.30 6 Accrediting
bodies such as the JCAHO, professional organizations such as the ANA, and
specialty groups such as the Association of Critical Care Nurses, the
Association of Operating Room Nurses, and the Emergency Nurses
Association have established standards for nursing documentation. 307
Hospitals, moreover, customarily develop their own standards for
documentation, which are often found in their policy and procedure
manuals. 308
Documentation should be legible, accurate, complete, and factual, yet not
excessively detailed.309 The patient's chart should include all significant
information that the nurse or other health care providers will require to assess,
treat, and care for the patient, as well as all relevant information received from,
and reported to, the physician. 310 The chart should be subject to expeditious
reading and analysis and, if necessary, immediate response by other health care
providers.311 When complying with a physician's order, particularly a verbal
order, the nurse must document the adherence to the order.312
The prudent nurse will avoid documenting any irrelevant comments
concerning the patient's personality as well as any personal opinions regarding
staffing problems, the level of care provided to the patient, the status of the
1. Not charting correct time when events occurred; 2. Failing to record verbal orders and
have them signed; 3. Charting actions in advance to save time; 4. Charting incorrect
data).
306 5ee LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 242-43; Iyer & Camp, supra note 198, at 77-93.
30 7LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 242-43.
308 Id.
309 See, e.g., Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 105; Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1573-74 ("The medical
chart should be just that - a concise, factual memorandum of the medical progress, vital
signs, and information notes on the patient .... ); Martin, supra note 303, at 63; FIESTA,
supra note 48, at 168-69; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 360.
310 See, e.g., N. Trust Co., 493 N.E.2d at 10 (nurse met standard of care in observing
new-born, "conscientiously" charting baby's progress, and communicating baby's
deteriorating condition to physician); Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 602; Hodges, 355 S.E.2d
at 106-07; Neubauer, supra note 305, at 20 ("Record all relevant details of a patient's care
and response to care, observations about his condition and change of status, and nursing
problems and solutions."); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 173-74; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5,
at 240; Iyer & Camp, supra note 198, at 89-90.
311 See Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1573.
312Martin, supra note 303, at 63-64; Neubauer, supra note 304, at 20; Vallot, supra note
38, at 99 and cases cited therein.
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patient or any health care provider as potential litigants, and the presence or
absence of any legal liability.313
Any method of documentation that concisely produces clinically significant
facts is appropriate. Charting, for example, by notes, checklists, graphs, logs,
abbreviations, "flow charts," or charting "by exception" (that is, charting the
abnormality or deviation rather than the ordinary or norm),314 should be
acceptable in most circumstances. 315 Long narrative commentary should be
avoided, as one objective is to spend less time writing and reading; lengthy
entries may be required in exceptional circumstances. 316
If a nurse forgets to document appropriate information, it is permissible for
the nurse to may make a late entry, as long as the late entry is identified as such
and signed and dated properly.317 If the nurse makes an error, the error should
be clearly noted as an "error," and the entry should be corrected promptly,
signed or initialed, and dated.318 The nurse should not erase, obliterate, or
otherwise remove the mistaken entry.319
313Barbara Calfee, 7 Things You Never Should Chart, NURSING 94 43 (1994); Neubauer,
supra note 305, at 21; Iyer & Camp, supra note 198, at 82; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at
360.
314Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 476 (defining charting by exception as "[a] system
whereby nurses did not record qualitative observations for each of the day's three shifts,
but instead made such notes only when necessary to chronicle important changes in a
patient's condition."); David A. Tammelleo, Charting by Exception: There Are Perils, RN,
Oct. 1994, at 71 ("Charting by exception is defined as much by what is omitted from the
patient's record as by what is included in it .... [Tihe general principle is to chart only
when something unusual or out of the ordinary happens.").
3 15See, e.g., Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1573 ("The medical chart should be... a concise,
factual memorandum ... and informative notes on the patient .... "); Hurlock, 709
S.W.2d at 881-82 (Nurses kept "patient care" or "flow charts," which documented care
for time in question but which were not kept or included as a part of patient's medical
records); FIESTA, supra note 48, at 174; Iyer & Camp, supra note 198, at 78; but see Lama,
16 F.3d at 481 ("[T]here was evidence from which the jury could have inferred that, as
part of the practice of charting by exception the nurses did not regularly record certain
information important to the diagnosis of an infection, such as the changing
characteristics of the surgical wound and the patient's complaints of post-operative
pain.... [T]he jury could have reasonably inferred that intermittent charting failed to
provide the sort of continuous danger signals that would be the most likely spur to early
intervention by a physician."); Tammelleo, Restraints: A Legal Catch-22, RN (Aug. 1994
Supp.), at 72 ("It is very important that [the nurse] pay strict attention to charting
parameters - more than [one] would with copious amounts of record-keeping if [the
nurse] work[s] in a hospital that has a charting-by-exception policy).
3 16 See, e.g., Garcia, 697 F. Supp. at 1573-74; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 174; Iyer & Camp,
supra note 198, at 78.
317 FIESTA, supra note 48, at 173-74; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 240; Iyer & Camp,
supra note 198, at 83.
318 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 240; Iyer & Camp, supra note 198, at 83-84;
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 360.
319 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 240; Iyer & Camp, supra note 198, at 83-84;
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Medical records are an extremely important source of information as to the
nature and quality of care the patient received. Careful and comprehensive
documentation by the nurse is not only essential to the successful diagnosis,
treatment, and care of the patient, but will also serve to protect the nurse from
liability.
L Equipment and Technology
The rapid advancement and proliferation of complex medical equipment
and technology have produced new areas of specialization in the health care
system and have certainly enhanced the delivery and quality of health care.
The increased utilization of, and dependence upon, this modem equipment
and technology have added significantly to the scope and complexity of
nursing responsibilities and have created a new category of potential legal
liability for nurses.
Nursing negligence or malpractice concerning the use of equipment and
technology can occur in several circumstances. The nurse initially must
determine whether the equipment and technology essential for a particular
area are in fact present.320 A nurse is expected to know the purposes, functions,
capabilities, limitations, risks, and safety features of a variety of
technologies.321 He or she is obligated to operate equipment in conformity with
the manufacturer's directions, instructions, or warnings as well as in accord
with any hospital, medical, or nursing standards. 322 A knowledgeable nurse
must exercise reasonable care in choosing a particular piece of equipment for
BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 360.
3 20 See, e.g., Dixon, 431 S.E.2d at 781-82 (nurses breached duty of care by not having
code cart properly restocked with a Number 4 Macintosh blade); Pirkov-Middaugh, 479
N.W.2d at 65 (liability for failing to obtain proper equipment); Calfee, supra note 313, at
47 and cases cited therein.
321See Wheeler, 866 S.W.2d at 46-47 (nurses committed malpractice by failing to use
equipment to determine the presenting part of fetus or its position and by failing to use
equipment to ascertain fetal heart tones following successive contractions); St. Paul Med.
Ctr., 842 S.W.2d at 814 (nurse deemed negligent for failing to monitor baby and detect
baby's hypoxia) (Physician expert "further stated that application of the EFM by a nurse
with proper training would have detected (baby's) condition and would have required
his delivery... early .... ); FIEsTA, supra note 48, at 63; Garlo, supra note 45, at 264.
322 See Lamb, 413 S.E.2d 722 (finding that the patient was injured when nurses used
disposable replacement parts made by one manufacturer, instead of those made by the
manufacturer who manufactured the instrument designed to dissolve cataracts, despite
the manufacturer's warning that only the manufacturer's disposable parts should be
used); Lucas, 562 So.2d at 1004 (nurse used improper technique for administering an
enema, despite directions which stated the proper technique; Salatka, supra note 216, at
89-90 and cases cited therein.
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a specific procedure or patient 323 and the nurse will be held liable for using the
improper equipment.324 Even when the nurse selects correctly, he or she can
be liable for an error in technique in using the equipment that causes harm to
the patient.325
Liability can also result when a nurse uses or fails to report defective,
contaminated, or otherwise unsafe equipment.326 Accordingly, nurses have a
duty to make a reasonable inspection of equipment prior to its use.327 If
equipment is not functioning properly, the nurse must take reasonable
measures to correct any defects or failure.328
Where equipment is inoperative or malfunctions, the nurse will be expected
to provide reasonable patient care and support without the equipment;329
equipment failure does not automatically and totally relieve the nurse of
liability.330
Appropriate maintenance and inspection procedures may provide a defense
in an equipment malfunction case.33 1 When a nurse inspects, cleans, or
323 See Battles, 430 So.2d at 314 (finding that the head nurse secured appropriate
personnel and equipment for patient suffering respiratory distress); LOEB & CAHILL,
supra note 5, at 120.
3 24 See, e.g., Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d of 904-06 (labor and delivery nurses committed
malpractice in part for not utilizing electronic fetal monitoring equipment); Lamb, 413
S.E.2d at 722; Central Anesthesia Assocs., 333 S.E.2d at 831, 833 (nurse improperly
administered anesthesia by means of a mask instead of an endotracheal tube; patient
suffered cardiac arrest and subsequent brain damage); Salatka, supra note 216, at 89-90
and cases cited therein.
325 See, e.g., Minster, 426 S.E.2d at 207-08 (nurse committed malpractice in part by
improperly placing a feeding tube and failing to properly verify placement of the
feeding tube; improper placement caused the pneumothorax eventually leading to
patient's death); Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d at 904-06 (labor and delivery nurses committed
malpractice inpartbynotproperly utilizing Dopplermonitoring equipment); Guilbeaux,
589 So.2d at 631 (floor nurse committed malpractice by improperly removing a
Jackson-Pratt drain from patient's back; x-rays subsequently revealed that a 3.5 inch
strip of tube had been left in plaintiff's back.); Calfree, supra note 313 and cases cited
therein; FIESTA, supra note 48, at 64-65 and cases cited therein; Guarriello, supra note 11,
at 80.
32 6Salatka, supra note 216, at 89-90 and cases cited therein; POZGAR, supra note 38, at
249.
32 7Hunnicutt, 986 F.2d at 123 (nurse deemed negligent for failing to properly inspect
instrument before use); Sullivan, supra note 211, at 18; FIEsTA, supra note 48, at 58; LOEB
& CAHILL, supra note 5, at 120; Salatka, supra note 216, at 89-90 and cases cited therein;
Carlo, supra note 45, at 264; Guarriello, supra note 11, at 80.
328 LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 120; Carlo, supra note 45, at 264.
3 29Salatka, supra note 216, at 91 and cases cited therein; Carlo, supra note 45, at 264-65
and cases cited therein.
33 0Salatka, supra note 216, at 91 and cases cited therein; Garlo, supra note 45, at 264-65
and cases cited therein.
33 1FIESTA, supra note 48, at 64-66 and cases cited therein.
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"trouble-shoots" equipment, she must strictly comply with the manufacturer's
and hospital's guidelines, document the activity, keep records of attendance at
all training sessions and, if an injury does occur, retain the piece of equipment
in question.332
As new and complex medical equipment appears, the nurse's
responsibilities increase, and his exposure to legal liability increases. The
nurse's expanded technological duties will demand greater technological
knowledge and the exercise of a higher and more specialized degree of care.
1. Safeguarding Patients
One of the nurse's most basic duties is to secure a patient's physical safety.
Patient falls are one of the most commonly litigated patient injuries.
Nurses have a duty to assess a patient's safety needs, foresee a need to protect
the patient from falls, and act as a reasonably prudent nurse would in taking
precautions such as the use of siderails or restraints. 333 Regardless of whether
the physician has ordered safety measures, the nurse, who is in continual
contact with the patient, is deemed responsible for making an independent
evaluation of the patient's safety needs.33 4 The failure to safeguard a patient
by not anticipating a fall and implementing safety measures subjects the nurse
to negligence or malpractice liability.
33 5
332 FIESTA, supra note 48, at 64-65 and cases cited therein; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5,
at 120.
333 See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hosp., 883 S.W.2d at 437 ('The evidence of the nurses
demonstrated that they had discretion to apply restraints to confused, disoriented,
woozy patients or to patients who did not possess sufficient physical control to avoid
failing .. "); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 141; Reilly, supra note 26, at 15; Garlo, supra
note 45, at 268-69; Greenlaw, supra note 198, at 125,127; but see Kimball, 421 So.2d at 310
(no duty for nurse to assist 79 year old patient in either walking or sitting when plaintiff
had no prior history of health problems, did not ask for assistance, and did not appear
visually incapacitated).
33 4Greenlaw, supra note 198, at 127.
33 5See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hospital, 883 S.W.2d at 437-38 (nurses deemed negligent for
placing confused, disoriented, woozy patient, lacking sufficient physical control, in
recliner chair without restraints); Gould, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 89 (plaintiff claimed siderails
of bed not properly raised which caused plaintiff to fall from bed and sustain multiple
injuries including a fractured hip); Daniel, 415 So.2d at 590 ("[Nurse] testified that he
knew that [patient] was hospitalized for weakness and vertigo as these conditions were
noted on his medical chart. However, in spite of this knowledge, [nurse] left plaintiff
sitting on the commode in the bathroom alone and returned to the nurses' station.")
Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at 622 (80 year old patient, recovering from a heart attack, was
given sleeping medication Dalmane by nurse; lower siderails of bed not raised, despite
drug manufacturer's warning of dizziness, staggering, and falls and despite hospital's
policy of raising siderails for confused or disoriented patients; patient fell and fractured
hip while attempting to go to bathroom); BERNZWEIG, supra note 13, at 141,142; Reilly,
supra note 28 at 15 and cases cited therein; Garlo, supra note 45, at 268-69 and cases cited
therein; Greenlaw, supra note 198, at 125 and cases cited therein.
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The exercise of reasonable care will reveal the possibility of a fall in certain
high-risk patients: the elderly, those patients under sedation or anesthesia or
recovering from the effects thereof, those receiving medication, patients
suffering from a head injury, patients complaining of dizziness or "blacking
out", those who request assistance, those who are uncoordinated, physically
disabled, or lack sufficient physical control; those who are mentally
incapacitated, confused, or disoriented, patients with impaired hearing, vision,
or balance, and those patients thrashing about, highly agitated, or
combative.33 6 These symptoms must be identified and necessary precautions
must be taken. The failure to take precautions, since doing so involves the
exercise of professional medical judgment, may be construed as a malpractice
matter requiring the use of expert testimony.33 7 Courts, however, generally
view a patient fall as a negligence issue not requiring expert testimony.338
A problem also confronts the nurse who does decide to utilize restraints.
Restraints are designed to protect the patient from falling, but restraints also
can endanger a patient. The nurse has to realize that restraints do not lessen
the nurse's responsibility for the patient's safety but increase it.339 The prudent
nurse must be aware of, and adhere to, the hospital's policies and regulations
regarding siderails and restraints. 340 Assurance must also be made that the
336 See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hospital, 883 S.W.2d at 437-38; Atkins v. Pottstown Memorial
Med. Ctr. 634 A.2d 258, 259 (Pa. Ct. Super. 1993) (plaintiff alleged that a nurse was
negligent for allowing a patient to go to bathroom after administering pre-operative
shots); Eversole v. Oklahoma Hosp. Founders Assoc., 818 P.2d 456, 460 (Okla. 1991)
(patient taking Demoral and Tylenol with codeine fell and was injured when a nurse
took the patient's right arm and, helping him to bed, attempted to support him with her
left arm); Putnam, 619 N.E.2d at 971-72 (patient fell from hospital bed while under
anesthesia and recovering from surgical procedure when bed rails not in an upright
position); Kimball, 421 So.2d at 310 (finding no liability when patient fell because there
was no prior history of health problems and the plaintiff did not ask for assistance);
Daniel, 415 So.2d at 590 (patient, who was hospitalized for dizziness and weakness,
whose left arm had been amputated, who was given medication which could cause him
to feel dizzy and weak, and who had been given an enema, fell off commode, injuring
himself); Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at 622 ("reasonable probability" that 80 year old patient
receiving sleeping drug Dalmane would become "confused and disoriented"); FIESTA,
supra note 48, at 3-4; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 119, 218; BERNZWEIG, supra note 13,
at 141-42; POZGAR, supra note 38, at 250-51 a cases cited therein; Greenlaw, supra note
198, at 125 and cases cited therein.
3 37 See, e.g., Hulman, 631 N.E.2d 327 (certified rehabilitation registered nurse used as
expert in patient fall case); Oxford, 438 S.E.2d at 172; Taylor, 491 N.E.2d at 810; Polunsky,
418 N.E.2d at 621; Garlo, supra note 45, at 268-69.
3 38See, e.g., Flowers, 884 P.2d at 144-46 (failure to restrain regarded as ordinary
negligence case); Gould, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 89; Landes v. Women's Christian Ass'n., 504
N.W.2d 139,141-42 (Iowa App. 1993); Candler, 354 S.E.2d at 876; Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at
622; Daniel, 415 So.2d at 590 (patient fall case treated as negligence cause of action).
33 9LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 119.
340 See, e.g., Tobia, 643 A.2d at 4 (nurse committed malpractice in patient fall case by
disregarding hospital policy mandating that no patient should be left unattended in an
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restraints fit properly and that the patient does not undo or readjust them. 341
In addition to deciding to use restraints and keeping siderails up when
indicated, nurses should always orient the patient as to where he or she is, help
the patient whenever he or she gets out of bed, eliminate total darkness in the
patient's room, instruct the patient to notify a nurse upon awakening and not
to get out of bed without assistance, institute frequent 'bed checks," instruct
the patient as to the correct application of restraints and siderails, and monitor
the hospital's premises, facilities, and equipment for water or other substances
that could cause a fall.342
The nurse, of course, should carefully document the use of any safety
measures and instructions given to the patient and should state the reasons
therefor.343 When a patient does fall, the nurse should immediately notify the
attending physician and nursing supervisor.344
When the nurse is alert to the possibility of a patient fall and adheres to
reasonable standards regarding safety precautions and safety instructions, falls
will be avoided; even if there is a fall resulting in an injury, the reasonably
prudent nurse should not be liable therefor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nursing is a profession. Nurses now possess the authority to act as
autonomous health care providers, exercising independent professional
judgment in complex situations beset with medical and legal implications. The
evolution and corresponding legal acknowledgement of nursing as a
profession means a corresponding increase in nurses' legal liability.
Nurses presently perform functions which previously were within the
exclusive sphere of physicians. No longer expected to attend upon and blindly
follow the directions of a physician, the nurse today actively participates in the
health care decision-making process. Consequently, a nurse's actions often
result from the nurse's own assessment of a complex medical circumstance and
a determination of the need for patient advocacy. The increase in
decision-making autonomy has resulted in a nurse's actions being judged by
standards of care adopted from typical physician medical malpractice.
Many more nurses are securing certification, and specialization within the
profession is growing. The progress to advanced practice nursing means nurses
will be held to progressively higher standards of care which in turn will serve
as a new basis for tort lawsuits against nurses. Indeed, recognition of nurses'
emergency room stretcher with the side rails down); Polonsky, 418 N.E.2d at 621-22
(patient fall case).
341LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 119.
342FIESTA, supra note 48, at 3-5 and cases cited therein; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at
118-119.
3 4 3 FIESTA, supra note 48, at 2-3; LOEB & CAHILL, supra note 5, at 119.
344 FIESTA, supra note 48, at 5.
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expanded responsibilities is evidenced by the multiplying number of nurses
who carry professional malpractice liability insurance and with progressively
augmented amounts of coverage.
To protect herself from legal liability, the nurse must be keenly aware of her
legal vulnerabilities and conduct herself accordingly. Such protection is best
achieved by becoming thoroughly familiar with negligence and malpractice
law--thus coming to appreciate the extent of a nurse's legal responsibility and
accountability. Simply put, nurses must provide patients with nursing care in
accord with the standards of the nursing profession. A thorough knowledge of
the standard of care embodied in the "reasonably prudent nurse" is an absolute
necessity for today's nurse.
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